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ABSTRACT

Multimarket competition has become a substantial part of the modern economy. As such, it
has drawn the attention of academics in both economics and strategy fields. Many studies have
found empirical evidence of mutual forbearance in several industries, but despite its importance,
its behavioral roots have not been explored. In my dissertation I integrate the reality of
boundedly-rational decision makers into the mutual forbearance hypothesis. I apply an outgrowth
of the behavioral theory of the firm – the shifting focus model of risk taking – to the study of
competitive behavior. I propose a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on
corporate strategic decisions - market entry and exit decisions, regardless of entry mode (e.g.
acquisitions) or exit mode (e.g. divestitures). This approach provides a granular view of changes
in the business scope of the firms in terms of product and geographic markets served. I test my
hypotheses in the U.S. property liability insurance industry over a 12-year period (1998-2008).
I argue that firms follow the mutual forbearance logic as long as their performance goals are
satisfied. However, under conditions of adversity, firms shift attention to recovering from the
performance shortfall and their actions deviate from the mutual forbearance predictions. This
dissertation shows that underperforming firms with abundant slack take longer to forbear, and
underperforming firms with limited slack start forbearing sooner, as predicted. By bridging
behavioral and competitive perspectives to the study of market entry and exit decisions, I
underscore the value of cross-fertilization in strategy research.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Multimarket competition, “a situation where firms compete against each other simultaneously
in several markets” (Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985, p. 87) has become a substantial part of the
modern economy. As such, it has drawn an increased attention of academics in both economics
and strategy fields (Baum and Greve 2001). The main assumption in multimarket theory is that
firms avoid competitive attacks against those rivals they encounter across several markets,
because of their increased interdependence – the so-called mutual forbearance hypothesis
(Edwards 1955). For example, if firm A attacks B in market X where B is dominant, firm B may
react not retaliating A in market X, but in market Y, where A has more to lose. Thus, in order to
avoid the risk of retaliation, firms forbear from attacking each other in order to reap the benefits
of decreased rivalry (Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985).
Multimarket contact has been shown to result in a decreased rivalry among competitors,
reflected in higher prices (e.g. Evans and Kessides, 1994), higher profits (e.g. Piloff 1999), and
higher growth (Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000). The benefits of having multimarket contact
also suggest that firms pursue market entry and exit, i.e. to expand and contract its scope of
businesses, according to the level of multimarket contact with competitors (e.g. Baum and Korn
1996). In spite of evidence in favor of the mutual forbearance hypothesis with respect to market
entry and exit, a broad question that arises is: Will firms always forbear from entry into a new
market or exit from markets because of the threat of retaliation? Or more specifically, my
research question is:
What are the boundary conditions of the mutual forbearance hypothesis with respect to
market entry and exit?
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The mutual forbearance hypothesis has strong behavioral implications as it predicts how
managers make entry and exit decisions under conditions of extended interdependence with
rivals, or essentially, how managers pursue risk under such conditions. For example, entering
into a target market can be considered a risky decision (Greve, 2000) and exiting from a focal
market reflects risk aversion (Shimizu, 2007). Such behavioral roots of the mutual forbearance
hypothesis are not adequately accounted for in the IO-based analysis of competitive dynamics.
Predicting risk behavior according to firm performance and aspiration levels, the behavioral
theory of the firm provides a natural contrast with the IO tradition and, therefore presents an
opportunity to set out and test in the real world alternative hypotheses that are not fully
consistent with each other.
This dissertation also acknowledges that research on multimarket competition has more
extensively explored market entry decisions than exit decisions. Because the behavioral theory of
the firm has significant value to add to our understanding of exit, I investigate whether and how
firm performance relative to aspiration level influences the effect of multimarket contact on
market exit decisions.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of
multimarket competition research. It begins by describing core concepts and mechanisms in
multimarket competition. I then review empirical studies on the relationship between
multimarket contact and competitive behavior, with a particular emphasis on market entry and
exit. I also provide an overview of studies on the behavioral theory of the firm and corporate
strategy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research issues that this dissertation seeks to
address.
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Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model of behavioral boundary conditions for the mutual
forbearance hypothesis with respect to market entry and exit. First, I describe the research model
and present the definition of multimarket contact. I then develop hypotheses that juxtapose the
dominant perspective of multimarket competition from IO economics with alternative
interpretations from the behavioral theory of the firm.
Chapter 4 describes the contextual setting in which the theoretical model will be tested. First,
the research requirements and challenges for testing the theoretical model are presented. Next, I
explain why the U.S. property and liability insurance industry is an appropriate empirical setting.
Concluding the chapter, I provide a brief description of the industry.
The methodologies for empirical analyses are introduced in Chapter 5, the results are
presented in Chapter 6, and the dissertation is concluded in Chapter 7, in which theoretical and
managerial implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Multimarket competition: core concepts and mechanisms
The theoretical roots of multimarket competition date back in the 1950‟s, coming from
economics and sociology traditions. The idea that the multiplicity of contacts among firms can
decrease the intensity of competition was first introduced by Edwards (1955). He hypothesized
that multimarket rivals are attentive to how competitive moves in a given market impacts
competition in other markets, and will tacitly coordinate their actions for the mutual benefit of all
parties. Thus, firms competing with one another in several markets develop an extended
interdependence in that competitive moves in one market may cause response in other markets.
Extended interdependence is also known as multimarket contact (MMC) – an important
construct in multimarket competition. The implication is that as the level of multimarket contact
increases, the level of rivalry decreases – the so-called mutual forbearance hypothesis.
In the mutual forbearance logic, multimarket contact creates a deterrence mechanism
(Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985), since firms are less likely to act aggressively due to the threat of
retaliation in other markets. This effect has paramount importance because firms that can limit
competitive pressures, that is to say decrease the level of rivalry, are typically able to earn higher
rates of return than those that cannot (Porter 1980).
In their seminal paper, Bernhein and Whinston (1990) developed a game-theoretic model of
mutual forbearance in which they formalize the conditions for the development of extended
interdependence among firms. They contend that in situations where markets are identical, firms
are identical, and technology exhibits constant returns to scale, multimarket contact does not aid
in sustaining collusive outcomes – the irrelevance result. In other words, a mere agglomeration
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of equal multimarket contacts alone does not help sustain forbearance. Hence, MMC may
facilitate cooperation only if some conditions are met. First, it is important the presence of
asymmetries either between the markets in which the same firms repeatedly interact with one
another (e.g. asymmetries in rates of growth or decline) or between the firms within and across
the multiple markets in which they interact (e.g. asymmetries in costs or demands). With
asymmetries, rivals are motivated to cooperate as each firm expands in markets where it is strong
and retreats from markets where it is weak. The presence of asymmetries underlies an important
construct in multimarket competition - spheres of influence. Because not all markets are equally
important to a given firm, firms may informally recognize the other‟s primacy of interest in
markets important to the other, hoping that its own interests will be similarly respected. For
example, firm A will let firm B to dominate an important market for B, hoping that B will let A
to dominate in an important market for A.
By extension, repeated interaction is another condition for mutual forbearance. When the
probability of continuing interaction is high, firms may be able to transfer incentive constraints
from a market where cooperation is sustainable to another where it is not – the transfer of market
power mechanism. However, the sustainability of cooperation depends on the credibility of the
punishment threat, so that firms do not have incentives to deviate from the competitive
equilibrium. Indeed, one of the main assumptions of the model is that defections are always
detected and punished – the perfect monitoring condition. In addition, none of the firms should
be able to gain more from deviating from its punishment strategy that it would subsequently lose
as a result of its deviation. In sum, it is both the prospect of gains stemming from cooperation
and the threat of retaliatory punishment in the future that sustain cooperation in the present.
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New theoretical advances in multimarket competition have refined and expanded the
Bernheim and Whinston‟s model. Matsushima (2001) has challenged the perfect monitoring
condition, showing that multimarket contacts can hold collusive equilibrium in place even when
firms cannot perfectly monitor their rivals. He theoretically proves that the collusive equilibrium
can be sustained if multimarket contacts make it easier to detect such defections. For example,
defection is less likely when a focal firm has many multimarket contacts in the focal market,
because the number of contacts increases the likelihood that the defection can be discovered.
Another condition that has been challenged is the asymmetry condition. Using gametheoretical modeling, Spagnolo (1999) proves that, irrespective of whether there are asymmetries
of any kind, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objective are concave,
i.e. firms are risk averse. This may be explained as follows. First, a strictly concave objective
function makes the strategic interactions interdependent: firms' evaluation of profits in one
market depends on profits realized in other markets. Second, the expected utility losses from
simultaneous retaliations in more markets are larger than (the sum of) those from independent
retaliations. Since incremental losses weigh more heavily than incremental gains when the
objective function is concave (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), multimarket contact gives firms
incentives to respect the tacit agreements. Evidently, the effect of multimarket contact is
strengthened under conditions of asymmetry or any other conditions postulated by Bernheim and
Whinston (1990).
Finally, an important condition for mutual forbearance to take place is that firms must have
internal coordination mechanisms (Jayachandran et al. 1999). As Golden and Ma (2003, 480) put
it “coordination between firms often requires coordination within firms.” This mechanism
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ensures that unit managers make decisions consistent with the corporation‟s goals, thus avoiding
unnecessary cross-market retaliation from rivals.
The basic model of multimarket competition is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure illustrates
that the extent to which firms are interdependent affects their competitive decisions which may
involve aggressive or cooperative behaviors. These decisions may involve changes in price or
changes in a firm‟s scope of businesses (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996). In this case, the multimarket
structure is impacted as firms enter and exit from markets. Finally, competitive behavior
influences organizational outcomes, such as enhanced performance (e.g. Gimeno and Woo 1996)
or stability in market shares (e.g. Heggestad and Rhoades 1978).

Market
market entry

Firm

multimarket
contact

recognition of
multimarket
contact

competitive
behavior
(entry/exit, price changes)

outcomes
(performance,
market share)

market exit

Figure 2.1 – Basic model of multimarket competition

In the next section, I review empirical work on this relationship, using a well known
terminology for extended interdependence: multimarket contact. Multimarket contact is broadly
defined here as a focal firm‟s encounters with its focal market‟s rivals in markets outside focal
market. In this conceptualization, multimarket contact is not just another aspect of industry
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structure, but, rather, is experienced differently by firms with different product and/or geographic
scopes.

2.2 Multimarket contact and competitive behavior
In the next paragraphs, I review empirical studies that examine the relationship between
multimarket contact and competitive behavior published in the past thirty years. First, I provide a
broad literature review on multimarket competition, organized in two periods: 1978-1999 and
1999-2008. For the first period I relied on two articles that summarize past quantitative findings
(Jayachandran et al., 1999; Korn and Baum, 1999), and for the second period, I conducted a new
literature search. After broadly reviewing the studies from both periods, I focus on empirical
studies that examine the main constructs of this dissertation – market entry and exit – which are
reviewed in turn.

2.2.1 The 1978-1999 period
Two articles summarize quantitative findings for this period: Jayachandran et al. (1999) and
Korn and Baum (1999). The former identified twenty studies, whereas the latter identified
nineteen studies (Table 1). Thirteen articles figure in both reviews, meaning that Jayachandran
et al. (1999) cites seven articles not cited by Korn and Baum (1999), and that Korn and Baum
(1999) cites six articles not cited by Jayachandran et al. (1999), as shown in Table 2.1. A close
analysis of the non-cited papers offers possible explanations for those papers not being cited in
the reviews. Jayachandran et al. (1999) only cite journal articles. Consequently, conference
papers are not cited (Gimeno and Korn 1994; Whitehead 1978). However, the review does not
cite three studies supporting evidence of mutual forbearance (Cotterill and Haller 1992; Martinez
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1990; Scott 1991) and one study not supporting it (Strickland 1985). Korn and Baum (1999) does
not cite studies published in 1999 (Gimeno 1999; Gimeno and Woo 1999), possibly because they
were available in the same year as the review‟s publication. However, the review does not cite
five articles featuring important evidence of multimarket competition (Fernandez and Marin
1998; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Parker and Roller 1997; Sandler 1988; Singal 1996). The final
list of articles contains twenty-five empirical studies, as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1 – Articles featured in literature reviews on multimarket competition (1978-1999)
Articles cited in Korn and Baum
(1999) and Jayachandran et al.
(1999)
Heggestad and Rhoades (1978)
Scott (1982)
Alexander (1985)
Feinberg (1985)
Rhoades and Heggestad (1985)
Mester (1987)
Barnett (1993)
Hughes and Oughton (1993)
Evans and Kessides (1994)
Gimeno and Woo (1996)
Baum and Korn (1996)
Boeker, Goodstein, Stephan, Murmann
(1997)
Baum and Korn (1999)

Articles cited in Korn and Baum
(1999) only

Articles cited in Jayachandran et
al. (1999) only

Whitehead (1978)
Strickland (1985)
Martinez (1990)
Scott (1991)
Cotteril and Haller (1992)
Gimeno and Woo (1994)

Sandler (1988)
Singal (1996)
Jans and Rosenbaum (1996)
Parker and Roller (1997)
Fernandez and Marin (1998)
Gimeno (1999)
Gimeno and Woo (1999)

Empirical work in both economics and strategy fields captured in the combined list
presented some conflicting results about the occurrence of mutual forbearance among firms. Five
studies found results contrary to mutual forbearance hypothesis (Alexander 1985; Mester 1987;
Rhoades and Heggestead 1985; Strickland 1985; Whitehead 1978). However, twenty studies
carried out in diverse industry settings found evidence of mutual forbearance (Heggestad and
Rhoades 1978; Scott 1982; Feinberg 1985; Sandler 1988; Martinez 1990; Scott 1991; Cotteril
and Haller 1992; Barnett 1993; Hughes and Oughton 1993; Singal 1996; Evans and Kessides
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1994; Baum and Korn 1996; Gimeno and Woo 1994; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Boeker,
Goodstein, Stephan, and Murmann 1997; Parker and Roller 1997; Fernandez and Marin 1998;
Baum and Korn 1999; Gimeno 1999; Gimeno and Woo 1999). According to Jayachandran et al.
(1999), one possible explanation for the lack of support might be the use of cross-sectional rather
than longitudinal data. Indeed, four out of five studies use cross-sectional settings except for
Rhoades and Heggestead (1985), all other, and not surprisingly, empirical evidence based on
longitudinal studies has largely supported the deterrence effect of multimarket contact on the
intensity of competition.
Table 2.2 – Empirical studies on multimarket competition (1978-1999)
Studies
Heggestad and Rhoades
(1978)

Sample and period
Top three bank holding
companies in 187 banking
areas, 1966-1972

Findings
Greater market share stability in local markets with
greater MMC

Whitehead (1978)

Florida bank holding
companies, 1976

The results were contrary to mutual forbearance
hypothesis: service changes and loan rates and fees
higher in markets with high MMC

Strickland (1985)

195 top U.S. manufactures
in 408 SICs, 1963

Scott (1982)

437 U.S. manufacturers,
1974

The results were contrary to mutual forbearance
hypothesis: firm profits lower in SICs with higher
MMC
Interaction between MMC and concentration has a
significant effect on market share instability

Alexander (1985)

Bank holding companies in
six states, 1975

The results were contrary to mutual forbearance
hypothesis: service changes and loan rates and fees
higher in markets with high MMC. However, quadratic
interaction effects of MMC and concentration were
significant

Feinberg (1985)

391 U.S. multiproduct
firms, 1982

Higher cost-price margins in industries where MMC
high;
Quadratic interaction between MMC and concentration

Rhoades and Heggestad
(1985)

1074 banks in 154 U.S.
markets, 1970-1979

Mester (1987)

171 savings and loan firms
in California, 1982

Lack of evidence of mutual forbearance hypothesis: no
effect of MMC on ROA, service charges, or loan rates
and fees
The results were contrary to mutual forbearance
hypothesis:
market share instability, service charges, and loan rates
and fees higher, and ROA lower, in markets with high
MMC;

20

When MMC was accompanied by high concentration,
the intensity of competition was greater
Sandler (1988)

123 U.S. airline markets,
before (1974-1976) and
after (1978-1980)
deregulation

MMC is related positively to rivalry

Martinez (1990)

100 largest bank holding
companies, 1984-1989

Greater stability in size rankings of banks in local
markets with greater MMC

Scott (1991)

64 U.S diversified firms in
35 oligopolistic industries,
1950

MMC leads to better firm performance; diversified
sellers‟ concentration has its strongest effect on profits
earned within an industry when MMC among the
sellers is high

Cotteril and Haller (1992)

20 largest U.S. supermarket
chains, 1971-1981

Lower market entry rates when the number of other
large chains in the market already high

Barnett (1993)

Life history of every firm in
the CPES sector of the
telephone industry,
1981-1986

Lower exit rates from state markets with higher MMC.

Hughes and Oughton
(1993)

418 U.K. manufacturers in
134 three-digit SIC
industries, 1979

Price-cost margins and industry rate of return on
capital higher in industries with higher MMC

Singal (1996)

14 mergers among airline
companies, 1984-1987

Airlines earned higher yields when MMC higher

Evans and Kessides
(1994)

1000 largest U.S. airline
city-pair routes, 1984-1988

Major airlines set higher fares on routes with higher
MMC

Baum and Korn (1996)

40 California commuter
airlines, 1979-1984

Lower entry and exit rates from routes where MMC
with competitors higher;
interaction between MMC and spheres of influence
was significant, whereas interaction between MMC
and concentration was insignificant

Gimeno and Woo (1994,
1996)

48 airlines in 3171 U.S.
city-pair routes, 1984-1988

Major airlines earned higher yields on routes where
their MMC with competitors higher; Strategic
similarity moderately increases rivalry

Jans and Rosenbaum
(1996)

25 U.S. regional cement
markets, 1974-1989

Interaction between MMC and concentration has a
significant positive effect on price

Boeker, Goodstein,
Stephan, Murmann (1997)

286 California hospitals in
163 product markets
(services), 1980-1986

Lower exit rates from product markets where MMC
with competitors higher

Parker and Roller (1997)

U.S. mobile telephone
industry

Firms set higher prices where MMC higher

Fernandez and Marin

2221 hotel establishments in

MMC has a positive effect on collusion at low levels of
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(1998)

Spain

concentration; and a negative effect at high levels of
concentration

Baum and Korn (1999)

15 California commuter
airlines, 1979-1984

Inverted U-shaped relationship between rates of market
entry and exit and MMC; Interactions (MMC and
relative MMC, MMC and relative firm size) were
significant

Gimeno (1999)

48 airlines in 2897 U.S.
city-pair routes, 1984-1988

Reciprocal MMCs decreases rivalry (high prices) and
increases market share sustainability more than
nonreciprocal MMCs

Gimeno and Woo (1999)

28 airlines in 3000 U.S.
city-pair routes, 1984-1988

MMC correlates with economies of scope; MMC have
a greater effect on prices and performance when they
occur in markets that share economies of scope

In examining mutual forbearance, researchers have measured the intensity of competition
using different approaches. Some studies infer the operation of mutual forbearance from higher
profits (Hughes and Houghton 1993; Feinberg 1985; Scott 1982, 1991), higher prices (Evans and
Kessides 1994; Fernandez and Marin 1998; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Parker and Roller 1997),
higher yields (Gimeno and Woo 1994, 1996; Singal 1996), greater market share stability
(Heggestad and Rhoades 1978), and greater stability in size rankings (Martinez 1990).
Rather than examining the outcomes, other studies measure the intensity of competition
through actual market entry and/or exit behavior (Barnett 1993; Boeker et al. 1997; Baum and
Korn 1996), applying the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the following way: Firms are less
likely to enter new markets in which the multimarket contact with incumbents is high, and are
less likely to exit from current markets in which the multimarket contact is high.

2.2.2 The 1999-2008 period
Empirical work conducted during this period is shown in Table 2.3. An interesting
characteristic of this period is that studies move away from traditional industries (e.g.
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manufacturing and banking), examining multimarket competition in empirical settings as diverse
as the prescription drug industry (Shankar 1999), the software industry (Young et al. 2000),
newspapers chains (Fu 2003), and fast food chains in Texas (Kalnins 2004). Also, studies look at
multimarket issues in countries other than the U.S., such as Canada (Li & Chuang, 2001; Li &
Greenwood, 2004), Japan (Greve 2000, 2006), Norway (Greve, 2008b), and Spain (Fuentelsaz &
Gomez 2006), and many examine multimarket behavior across countries (Chintagunta &
Desiraju 2005; Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, & Wan, 2005; Yu & Cannella 2007). Broadening the
scope of multimarket studies has greatly contributed to the field. For example, there is now
mounting evidence of mutual forbearance in under-researched industries as well as other
countries, a situation that strengthens the theoretical validity of multimarket constructs and that
adds more reputation to research on competition in multimarket contexts.
Similarly to earlier studies, some empirical studies infer mutual forbearance from evidence of
decreased rivalry or enhanced performance. Findings of these studies do not differ substantially
from those reported by Jayachandran et al. (1999) and Korn and Baum (1999). In general, the
evidence of mutual forbearance under conditions of high multimarket contact is still supported,
in terms of both decreased rivalry (Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005; Shankar 1999) and enhanced
performance (Fu 2003; Gupta 2001; Li and Greenwood 2004; Pilloff 1999).

Table 2.3 – Empirical studies on multimarket competition (1999-2008)
Studies

Sample and period

Findings

Korn and Baum (1999)

15 California commuter airlines
in 105 competitor dyads, 19791984

MMC may arise more as a result of chance and
imitation of market choices of high-performing
competitors than as a result of purposive MMC
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Pilloff (1999)

6233 U.S. banks, 1992-1995

MMC outside of a reference market lessens
competition in the reference market and hence
enhances performance (ROA) of a focal bank

Shankar (1999)

23 entries and 59 incumbent
responses from the U.S.
prescription drug industry,
1970s and the 1980s

A brand‟s introductory marketing spending is
lower if the entering firm has MMC with the
incumbents.

Greve (2000)

174 Tokyo-based banks in 20
geographic markets, 1894-1936

Density dependence, imitation of large firms‟
decisions, and momentum are sufficient for
predicting branch location decisions.
Organizations are likely to establish multimarket
contacts with single-market competitors, but
unlikely to do so with multimarket competitors,
contradicting the mutual forbearance hypothesis

Haveman and Nonnemaker
(2000)

321 California savings and loan
companies in 58 counties, 19771991

Inverted U-shaped relationship between rates of
market growth and entry and MMC; interaction
between MMC and market dominance was
positively significant

Young, Smith, Curtis,
Grimm, Simon (2000)

152 observations of 20 U.S.
software firms, 1987-1991

Less attacks in product markets where MMC with
competitors higher, and faster retaliation in
product markets where MMC with competitors
higher

Gupta (2001)

1738 projects with 8943 bids in
highway procurement auctions
in Florida, 1981-1986

Propensity to collude increases with MMC as
repeated contacts among firms are found to have a
positive effect on the winning low bid which leads
to higher profit.

Li and Chuang (2001)

232 Canadian general insurance
companies,
1992-1998

Multimarket firms‟ performance in a given market
depends on the number and simplicity of their
strategic actions – both absolutely and vis-à-vis
those of others competing in the market unit.

Audia, Sorenson, Hage
(2001)

All American shoes
manufacturing plants,
1940-1989
28 airlines in 3000 U.S. citypair routes, 1984-1988

As the degree of multimarket contact increases,
the likelihood of firm exit declines.

Fu (2003)

465 daily newspapers in the
U.S. midwestern states, 1998

Evidence of spheres of influence: strong linkage
between the MMC and reduced circulation
competition. Also, advertising rates are distinctly
higher in MMC markets

Stephan, Murmann,
Boeker, Goodstein (2003)

395 hospitals in California in
163 product markets (services)

Inverted U-shaped relationship between rate of
market entry and MMC; CEO tenure has an effect
on the relationship: newer CEOs persisted in
entering the market of their rivals, even at higher
levels of MMC

Gimeno (2002)

Multimarket contacts established by chance have
the same effect on competition as intentional
multimarket contacts
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Kalnins (2004)

978 units of 3 fast-food chains
in Texas,
1980-1995

Lower entry rates into locations with same
franchise branches present (i.e. markets with large
divisional MMC)

Li and Greenwood (2004)

276 Canadian general insurance
companies, 1993-1998

Main effects: Multimarket competition per se
results in lower performance.
Moderators: Resource similarity positively
moderates the relationship between MMC and
performance
MMC between dissimilar firms may fail to deter
competitive aggression because they have not
developed familiarity with each other, which
enables forbearance and raises performance

Chintagunta and Desiraju
(2005)

Observations on antidepressants
(Prozac, Zolotf, and Paxil)
across the U.S., the U.K.,
Germany, France, and Italy

Evidence of spheres of influence: Market
interactions in the U.S. market soften competition
in the Italian market, but make the interactions
between brands more competitive in the U.K.
market.

Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal,
Wan (2005)

43 U.S. telecommunications
firms in 5 countries,
1985-1995

Domestic market positions of focal firms and prior
movers influence mimetic international entry
behavior.

Gimeno, Chen, Bae (2006)

54 US airlines in 4,994
domestic city-pair markets,
1979-1995

Firms faced with intense rivalry reposition
themselves away from the most similar
competitors in terms of served markets (those with
high market overlap)

Greve (2006)

174 Tokyo-based banks,
1894-1936

Firms avoid extensions of MMC beyond the
minimum of 2 contacts
Firms enter markets with competitors that have
high intentional contact.

Fuentelsaz and Gomez
(2006)

77 Spanish savings banks, 19861999,
34,529 bank-market-year
observations

Main effect: There is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between MMC and market entry rate
Moderators: The effect of MMC is greater when
multimarket rivals are more dissimilar, and is
lesser when contacts are reciprocal.

Yu and Cannella (2007)

13 largest global automobile
firms, 27 countries, 1995-2001

The degree of MMC an MNE has with a given
rival is positively related to its response speed.

Greve (2008b)

329 firms from the insurance
industry in Norway, 1912-1986

Defection from mutual forbearance is more likely
in markets where the focal firm has few
multimarket contacts since the probability of
detection is lower in such markets.

For instance, Fu (2003) found that newspaper chains reduce circulation competition. From the
spheres of influence logic, newspaper chains decrease the level of rivalry in non-core markets in
order to signal subordination to rival chains, expecting the same treatment in their core markets
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(Gimeno, 1999). Advertising rates are also found to be relatively higher in MMC markets (Fu
2003). Pilloff (1999) also reports enhanced firm performance in a longitudinal study of 6,000
U.S. banks. He found that a firm‟s presence in markets outside the firm‟s core market lessens
competition, thus leading to enhanced firm performance.
Of particular importance, recent empirical work has challenged some of the mutual
forbearance assumptions. For example, in its original conceptualization, the mutual forbearance
model assumes perfect monitoring, that is to say, defections from the collusive equilibrium are
always detected and punished (Bernheim and Whinston 1990). However, Matsushima (2001)
theoretically proved that collusive equilibrium can be held under conditions of imperfect
monitoring if the likelihood of being discovered is high. Greve (2008b) tested this argument by
conducting his research in an empirical context with less observable pricing and quality – the
insurance industry in Norway – and found support for these ideas.
Another important point about recent research on multimarket competition is that studies
within strategy field, different than those within IO economics (e.g. Evans and Kessides 1994),
use information on actual competitive actions to measure competitive behavior, rather than
inferring mutual forbearance from higher prices, for example. Young, Smith, Curtis, Grimm and
Simon (2000), providing an empirical test of Chen‟s (1996) propositions, found that under
conditions of high MMC with competitors, an attack is less likely, but if it occurs, the retaliation
will be faster. In a large scale study, Yu and Cannella (2007) found similar results among the
thirteen largest global automobile manufacturers operating in 27 countries. Li and Chuang
(2001) examined the impact of competitive interaction among multimarket firms at the market
level, and found that market share in a given market depends on the number and simplicity of
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their strategic actions – both absolutely and vis-à-vis those of others competing in the market
unit.
Market entry and exit, as observable events of competitive behavior (Chen 1996) have been
extensively investigated. Since this dissertation focuses on the relationship between multimarket
contact and market entry/exit decisions, empirical research on this relationship is summarized
and reviewed in the next section.

2.3 Competitive antecedents of market entry and exit
Table 2.4 presents detailed information about each study on the relationship between
multimarket contact and market entry/exit: form of relationship, types of markets, moderators,
empirical setting, and empirical testing issues (MMC‟s level of analysis and scaling, whether
MMC is weighed by importance, methodology used, and whether hypotheses are supported).

2.3.1 Form of relationship
Eight studies examine market entry decisions only (Korn and Baum 1999; Greve 2000;
Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz & Gomez 2006; Greve 2006),
two studies examine market exit decisions only (Barnett 1993; Boeker et al. 1997), and two
studies examine both market entry and exit decisions (Baum and Korn 1996, 1999).
Studies have predicted different forms of relationship between multimarket contact and
market entry/exit. Earlier empirical work has examined the dampening effects of multimarket
contact on rates of entry and exit (Barnet 1993; Baum and Korn, 1996; Boeker et al. 1997), as
they hypothesize a negative linear relationship between the constructs. Results support the
operation of mutual forbearance, since market entry and exit rates decrease as multimarket
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contact increases. Indeed, the theoretical logic in earlier work has been primarily built on the
forbearance effect that is created once multimarket contact levels are high. However, it does not
explain how multimarket structures are created in the first place (Korn & Baum 1999). As
Stephan et al. (2003, p. 404) put it: “Firms and their managers, not only find themselves in
multimarket structures, but must construct them as well.”
In filling this gap, recent studies have proposed a revised relationship between multimarket
contact and competitive behavior. Studies have consistently found an inverted-U-shaped rather
than a negative linear relationship between multimarket contact and market entry (Baum & Korn
1999, Greve 2006; Haveman & Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz & Gomez
2006), as shown in Figure 2.2. This relationship is characterized by escalation of competition
below a certain threshold for which the likelihood of competing aggressively reaches its
maximum, and de-escalation of competition above this threshold, when firms recognize the
interdependence of their markets, and because of the threat of retaliation, do not engage in

Intensity of
competition

aggressively competitive behavior.

Threshold

MMC

Figure 2.2 – Inverted U-shaped relationship between multimarket contact and competitive
behavior
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Evidently, there are alternative explanations for market entry and exit. Some studies propose
behavioral models with competing hypotheses in which the initiation and further expansion of
multimarket contact have antecedents other than the level of multimarket contact (Greve 2000;
Korn & Baum 1999), and, at the extreme, these decisions can be attributed to chance (Korn &
Baum 1999). Researchers in this stream draw from organizational ecology, behavioral, and
institutional theories, and argue that if multimarket contact is such a pervasive construct, it is
important to examine other causes for its creation and existence.
Korn & Baum (1999) examines the influence of chance, behavioral, and mimetic processes
in the creation of multimarket structures. They found that multimarket structures will emerge as
a result of chance but that subsequent market entry will be determined by mimetic processes.
Similarly, Greve (2000) examine market entry decision by proposing four competing predictions.
Market entry decisions can be influenced by density of firms in the focal market (the
organizational ecology argument), mimetic processes in which firms will seek legitimacy (the
institutional argument), momentum processes in which firms will repeat behaviors that have
been successful in the past (the behavioral argument), and mutual forbearance processes in which
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Table 2.4 – Empirical research on MMC and Market Entry/Exit
Article

Competitive
behavior

Form of
relationship

Barnett (1993)

Exit

Negative
linear

Baum & Korn (1996)

Entry / Exit

Negative
linear

Boeker et al. (1997)

Exit

Negative
linear

Baum & Korn (1999)

Entry / Exit

Negative
Curvilinear

Korn & Baum (1999)

Entry

Greve (2000)

Moderators

Types of
Markets

MMC level of
analysis and
scaling
firm-in-market
(count)

MMC
weighed by
importance?
No

Methodology

Hypotheses
supported?

Event history
analysis

Yes

Geographic

firm-in-market
(percentage)

No

Event history
analysis

Yes

Product
(hospital
services)
Geographic

firm-in-market
(percentage)

No

Logistic
Regression

Yes

Dyad (count)

No

Event history
analysis

Yes

Positive
Linear

Geographic

Dyad (count)

No

Event history
analysis

No

Entry

Positive
Linear

Geographic

firm-in-market
(count)

No

Event history
analysis

No

Haveman &
Nonnemaker (2000)

Entry

Negative
curvilinear

Market
dominance

Geographic

firm-in-market
(proportion)

No

Event history
analysis

Yes

Stephan, Boeker,
Goodstein, and
Murmann (2003)
Fuentelsaz & Gomez
(2006)

Entry

Negative
Curvilinear

CEO tenure

firm-in-market
(percentage)

No

Logistic
Regression

Yes

Entry

Negative
Curvilinear

Concentration,
reciprocity,
resource
similarity

Product
(hospital
services)
Geographic

firm-in-market
(percentage)

Yes

Event history
analysis

Yes

Greve (2006)

Entry

Negative
Curvilinear

geographic

firm-in-market
(count)

No

Event history
analysis

Yes

Geographic

Market
dominance

Relative size,
relative MMC
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firms will seek deterrence (the forbearance argument). He found that market entry decisions
involve momentum and mimetic processes, and mutual forbearance benefits are the least concern
for decision-makers.
Interestingly, by focusing on the bottom line of multimarket strategies – the performance
effect of intentional and unintentional multimarket contacts – Gimeno (2002) was able to
reconcile both views on the emergence of multimarket contacts. Using the typology of strategies
developed by Mintzberg et al. (1985), he views the intentional market expansion as a deliberate
strategy, and the unintentional market expansion determined by chance, as an emergent strategy.
He examined the influence of these strategies on subsequent performance and found that
multimarket structures will lead to a higher level of performance, regardless of the type of
strategy pursued. In other words, the performance effect is determined by the realized strategy.

2.3.2 Moderators
Equally importantly, studies have also examined whether and how moderators influence the
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry and exit. Baum & Korn (1996) and
Haveman & Nonnemaker (2000) found a significant positive moderating effect of market
dominance on market entry, meaning that the effect of multimarket contact will be stronger in
markets dominated by a very few firms, which is consistent with IO expectations (Porter 1980).
Asymmetry in competitors‟ size also has an impact on the mutual forbearance effect. For
example, Baum and Korn (1999) found that as multimarket contact increases, smaller
competitors will be less likely to enter and more likely to exit from a larger competitors‟
markets. Moreover, asymmetry in a firm‟s level of multimarket contact with a given competitor
relative to the firm‟s other competitors can also have an effect on the relationship between the
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multimarket contact and market entry. Specifically, Baum and Korn (1999) found that firms
direct their competitive efforts towards low multimarket contact competitors as a consequence of
forbearing from rivalrous actions with competitors with which they have higher multimarket
contact. Similarly, the operation of the spheres of influence was found significant as the
reciprocity of contacts amplifies the dampening effect of multimarket contact on market entry
rates (Fuentelsaz & Gomez 2006).
Theoretical studies have long emphasized the importance of bringing resource similarity into
competitive dynamics theory (Chen 1996; Jayachandran et al., 1999), and empirical studies have
confirmed the significant effects of resource similarity on the relationship between multimarket
contact and intensity of competition. For example, multimarket contact is more influential on
competitive actions of firms with dissimilar resources (Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006), as the
information provided by the multimarket contacts might be the only mechanism in achieving
tacit coordination when interfirm dissimilarity impairs the interpretation of mutual forbearance
signals.
Only one study examines the effects of risk preferences on the mutual forbearance
hypothesis. Stephan et al. (2003) focus on the role of a firm‟s CEO in pursuing strategic change,
represented by entry into new markets. They argue that newer and longer-tenured CEOs are
likely to have different preferences for particular competitive actions. Whereas the former has a
mandate for change and are less likely to abide by the tacit agreements with competitors, the
former are more likely to rely on what worked for them in the past. Consequently, longer-tenured
CEOs would be more sensitive to the implications of multimarket contact than newer CEOs.
Accordingly, they found support for these arguments.
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In sum, current research in market entry and exit have examined the moderating effects of
independent variables at the market- (market dominance), the firm- (CEO tenure), and the dyad
levels (relative size, relative multimarket competition, and resource similarity).

2.3.3 Empirical setting
The majority of studies examines market entry and exit in geographic markets (Barnett 1993;
Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn and Baum 1999; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and
Nonnemaket 2000; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006). Only two studies analyze entry into and exit
from product markets (Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan et al. 2003), specifically the hospital services.
It is important to understand the empirical context in which the studies have been conducted. I
was able to identify characteristics of the industries under observation in seven studies (Barnett
1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn and Baum 1999; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006; Greve
2000, 2006), but for the remaining studies (Boeker et al. 1997; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000;
Stephan et al. 2003), I had to search for authors‟ previous articles.
Baum and Korn (1996, 1999) tested their hypotheses using data describing city-pair market
changes of commuter air carriers operating in California from 1979 to 1984. In this period,
federal deregulation triggered an intense period of reorientation and competitive interaction.
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) look at entry behavior into new geographic markets in the Spanish
savings banks industry after industry‟s deregulation – when restrictions to branching were
eliminated – between 1986 and 1999. They explicitly report that multimarket contact in 1986
was almost inexistent. Greve (2000, 2006) examine the establishment of Tokyo-based banks in
20 geographic markets. Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) use data from the savings and loan
associations (thrift) operating in California between 1977 and 1991. During this period, thrifts
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faced deregulatory initiatives that transformed their competitive environment from placid and
constrained to uncertain and volatile (Haveman 1993). Finally, Stephan et al. (2003) examined
hospitals in California in the period between 1980 and 1986. This was a particularly turbulent
period for the U.S. health care sector in which new regulations intensified competition
(Goodstein, Boeker, and Stephan 1996).
In sum, although the reviewed studies use data from different time periods and different
industries (thrifts, savings banking, airlines, hospitals), they have one aspect in common: that the
industries under observation were experiencing intense regulatory changes and heightened
competition.

2.3.4 Empirical testing
Empirical work on multimarket competition has used different measures of the multimarket
contact construct, as shown in Table 2.4. The possible levels of multimarket contact measure are
summarized in Table 2.5: market level, firm-in-market level, and dyad level. A market level of
multimarket contact captures the level of multimarket contact among all incumbents in a market.
Such a level of measure reflects the IO economics roots of the multimarket competition
literature. IO economists have a deep-rooted interest in discovering whether concentration in a
particular industry poses antitrust dangers to consumers (Scherer and Ross 1980). None of the
studies use measures at this level of analysis because market-level multimarket contact is an
industry- rather than a firm-level attribute.
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Table 2.5 – Levels of Analysis of Multimarket Measures
Level

Notation

Definition

Cross-level relationship

Dyad level

MMC ijm

The most basic level

Firm-in-market level

MMC im

Number of markets in which firms
i and j meet outside focal market
m
Number of markets in which firm i
meets all its competitors outside
focal market m

Market level

MMC m

Number of markets in which all
firms meet each other outside
focal market m

The sum of dyad level across all
firms and markets outside focal
market m

The sum of dyad level across all
markets outside focal market m

Firm-in-market level of measure captures a focal firm‟s contact with all its rivals across all
markets. This level of measure is suitable for studies of the competitive activity of firms within
specific markets (Gimeno and Jeoung 2001). The majority of studies analyze the effects of
multimarket contact at the firm-in-market level (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et
al. 1997; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz
and Gomez 2006). Dyad level of measures focuses on the competitive interaction between two
firms, representing the most basic level of analysis (Gimeno and Jeoung 2001). Only two studies
examine multimarket competition at this level: Baum and Korn (1999) and Korn and Baum
(1999). Gimeno and Jeoung (2001) argue that the dyadic level may be more appropriate in
examining actions that are dyadic in nature, such as attack against a specific rival.
Studies differ in how they capture the level of multimarket contact. In its most basic form,
multimarket contact describes the count of multimarket contacts that a firm has with incumbents
outside the focal market (Barnett 1993; Greve 2000, 2006), whereas some studies calculate the
percentage of multimarket contact, i.e. the ratio of the count of multimarket contacts to the total
number of markets in which they operate (Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan et
al. 2003; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006). To illustrate how the scaling occurs, suppose that a
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potential entrant to a target market operates in 5 markets. If this potential entrant already
encounters with one of the target market‟s incumbent in 3 markets, they have a multimarket
contact of 60%. The level of multimarket contact would go down to 6% if the focal firm
operates in 50 markets, and the count measure of multimarket contact would still be 3 in both
situations.
According to the mutual forbearance logic, some contacts may be more important than
others. Hence, some studies weigh the contacts according to their strategic importance in an
attempt to model how managers weigh their market entry and exit decisions (e.g. Fuentelsaz and
Gomez 2006). Yet Gimeno and Jeoung (2001) urge researchers to weigh their multimarket
measures only when there are theoretical grounds, because the use of different scales and
weights can alter the distribution of the measures.
Finally, in estimating the effect of multimarket contact on market entry and exit, studies
have applied two different methodologies: logistic regression modeling (Boeker et al. 1997;
Stephan et al. 2003) and event history analysis (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn
and Baum 1999; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Fuentelsaz and Gomez
2006). The use of either methodology does not seem to impact the expected results since the
inverted-U-shaped curve was found in studies using both types of methods. The differences and
suitability of these methodologies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

2.4 Behavioral antecedents of market entry and exit

Market entry and exit decisions are considered corporate strategic decisions and, as such, are
in the realm of the most fundamental areas of inquiry in strategic management (Rumelt,
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Schendel, & Teece, 1994). The behavioral perspective has been applied to the study of such
decisions. Regarding market entry, Haleblian, Kim, Rajagopalan (2006), using a sample of U.S.
commercial banking industry, found that acquisition performance positively influenced the
likelihood of a firm‟s making a subsequent acquisition. Iyer and Miller (2008) examined the
effect of performance relative to aspiration level – the attainment discrepancy (Lant, 1992) – and
found that acquisition activity increases as performance rises among firms performing below
aspiration level, but fall among firms performing above aspiration level in a sample of U.S.
manufacturing firms.
Using different terms to define market exit (e.g. sell-offs, spin-offs, divestiture, divestment),
many studies support a negative relationship between firm performance and exit, in that as firm
performance decreases, the likelihood of exit increases (Montgomery and Thomas 1988;
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991; Chang 1996; Steiner 1997). The main rationale is that external
pressures in the form of low company profits help break down the divestment barriers.
While some studies focus on the effect of firm performance, others look at both the business
unit and firm performance levels. Some studies also analyze relative performance, that is to say,
the business unit performance related to the core business performance or the core industry
performance. For example, Duhaime and Grant (1984) found that low competitive and financial
strength of the business unit relative to industry peers can trigger exit decisions, and Markides
(1992) found that a firm is more likely to divest business units the higher the profitability and
advertising intensity of its core industry. However, Cho and Cohen (1997) raise an important
characteristic of the relationship between units. They argue that because of cross subsidization
from profitable business units, firms do not sell off poorly performing business units until the
firm experiences significant underperformance relative to its industry peers.
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Current research on the relationship firm performance and market exit decisions pay now
more attention to the interaction effects of performance and other independent variables. Sanders
(2001), for example, defines firm performance as a situational characteristic that affects the
divestiture decisions. Observing 250 firms from the Standard and Poor‟s 500 (S&P 500), he
found that poor performance not only results in negatively framed decisions, but also increases
the CEO's role in such negative outcomes. Shimizu and Hitt (2005) investigated factors that
constrain and facilitate divestment of business units as performance decreases. They found that
factors contributing to organizational inertia (e.g. size and age) delay the divestiture of poorly
performing acquired units, but factors that decrease organizational inertia (e.g. new CEO) are
found to accelerate the divestiture of poorly performing units. In a recent study, Shimizu (2007)
proposes a multi-level model that integrates arguments from three distinct theories: prospect
theory, behavioral theory of the firm and the threat-rigidity thesis. Studying the divestiture of
formerly acquired units, he found that these decisions are influenced by psychological and
organizational factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of divestiture as unit performance
decreases.

2.5. Conclusion: Gaps in current research and opportunities for future research
In the next paragraphs, I identify gaps in prior research and explain how this dissertation seeks to
address them.

2.5.1 Market entry and exit as changes in a firm‟s business scope
Across all corporate strategy studies reviewed, there is one recurring theme: entry and exit
transactions involve change in ownership, that is to say, entry implies that firms are being

38

acquired and exit implies that business units are being sold, spun-off, or carved-out and assets
are being transferred to new owners. Thus, the focus is more on the adjustment in ownership than
the adjustment in the scope of the firm. Yet the central question posed by theoretical and
empirical research in corporate level strategy is: “In what product markets and businesses should
the firm compete?”
When focusing on ownership changes, one overlooks the possibility that changes in a firm‟s
business portfolio may not involve transfer of ownership, as firms can enter into new markets or
exit from markets by internally restructuring. For example, MBNA in England decided to
withdraw from the consumer lending market, but it has not sold its business unit. Rather, it has
internally restructured its operations by transferring 400 employees to other areas of the
company (Gleeson 2007).
The conceptualization that closely approaches the idea of entry and exit decisions as changes
in a firm‟s scope is the one adopted in multimarket studies (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996; Gimeno
and Woo 1996). In this dissertation, every firm is conceived to occupy a market domain, defined
as “the set of markets in which a firm operates” (Baum and Korn 1996, p. 256). This definition is
aligned with D‟Aveni‟s (2001, p. 4) definition of a firm‟s business portfolio as a “geo-product
portfolio, consisting of geo-product markets”. A company‟s geo-product portfolio represents “the
company‟s position on the competitive space delineated by geographies and by the company‟s
products and services” (D‟Aveni 2001, p. 4). This definition of market provides a granular view
of the changes in the scope of the firm in terms of product and geographic markets served.
Consistent with this definition, market entry is defined as the inclusion of a new market into a
firm‟s portfolio, regardless of how entry is pursued (e.g. acquisition or internal development),
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and market exit is conceptualized as the withdrawal from a given market, regardless of how exit
is pursued (e.g. sell-off, dissolution, internal restructuring, etc).

2.5.2 The overlooked argument in corporate strategy literature
Few strategic decisions draw so much attention from the corporate world and can have such
an influence on a firm‟s success as corporate diversification decisions. Accordingly, the
relationship between diversification and firm performance as well as the investigation of its
antecedents are at the core of much of corporate strategy research (Palich, Cardinal, Miller,
2000).
In line with arguments first advanced by Penrose (1959) and Teece (1982), most research
emphasizes the role of internal determinants of diversification, such as firm-specific resources
and capabilities (e.g. Miller, 2004; Farjoun, 1998; Markides and Williamson 1996; Robins and
Wiersema 1995). However, the influence of the competitive context on diversification decisions
is also a noteworthy factor (Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, and Wan, 2005). For instance,
profitability in a focal business depends not only on a firm‟s economies of scope, but also on its
rivals‟ economies of scope and its competitive interaction with their rivals (Gimeno and Woo,
1999; Li and Greenwood, 2004). Hence, this dissertation seeks to fill this gap by focusing on the
competitive antecedents of corporate strategic decisions.

2.5.3 A behavioral perspective of multimarket competition
Research in multimarket competition has been instrumental in bringing the competitive
context into diversification and divestiture decisions. However, because of its IO roots,
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multimarket research does not examine how changes in the risk preference of decision makers
influence the competitive behavior of multimarket firms.
Except for a few studies that adopt a behavioral approach to multimarket competition (e.g.
Greve 2000; Korn and Baum 1999; Stephan et al. 2003), the role of managers in multimarket
competition has been largely ignored. For instance, Gimeno (2002) emphasizes that future
research needs to investigate the antecedents and motivations to establish and expand
multimarket contact. Korn and Rock (2001) are even more emphatic by saying that “in order to
move multimarket theory forward, empirical work must begin to penetrate the “black box” of
managerial decision-making in multi-market environments.”
If the research objective is to explain and understand the actual behaviors of individual firms
as they interact with competitors, a behavioral perspective of multimarket competition may have
distinct advantages. Hence, I argue that multimarket competition research can be greatly
enhanced if it incorporates the reality of bounded rationality of decision-makers. Predicting risk
behavior according to firm performance and aspiration levels, the behavioral theory of the firm
provides a natural contrast with the IO tradition and, therefore presents an opportunity to set out
and test in the real world alternative hypotheses that are not fully consistent with each other.
Although the behavioral perspective has recently been applied to the study of corporate
strategic decisions (e.g. Haleblian, Kim, Rajagopalan, 2006; Iyer and Miller, 2008), I propose a
theoretical model that explicitly integrates behavioral and competitive perspectives to the study
of market entry and decisions. My behavioral model of multimarket competition is presented in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 – THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter develops a research framework for understanding the impact of behavioral
contingencies on the mutual forbearance hypothesis, proposing a behavioral model of
multimarket competition that focuses on market entry and exit behavior. It begins by describing
the theoretical model, its elements and links. Next, I present the core constructs from the
behavioral theory of the firm – firm performance and organizational slack – and how they impact
risk behavior. Finally, I develop hypotheses for the impact of performance and organizational
slack on the mutual forbearance hypotheses for market entry and market exit.

Figure 3.1 – Theoretical model: Elements and links

performance
relative to
aspiration level
(i, t-1)

slack (i, t-1)
market entry
(i, m, t)
multimarket
contact (i, m, t-1)

business scope
decision (i, m, t)

performance
(i, t+1)
Market exit
(i, m, t)

Figure 3.1 presents the elements and links of the theoretical model. The solid lines are the
links explored in this dissertation, whereas the dashed lines are featured for completeness of the
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model. The core element of the model is the scope decision with respect to market entry and exit.
Firms expand and contract their scope according to the level of multimarket contact,
performance relative to aspiration level, and organizational slack. The mutual forbearance logic
focuses on the relationship between multimarket contact and scope decisions, and my
dissertation examines the moderation effect of performance relative to aspiration level and
organizational slack on that relationship. Although I acknowledge that market entry and exit
subsequently impact firm‟s performance, I do not explore this relationship in my dissertation.

3.1 Performance relative to aspiration level, slack, and risk taking
The relationship of a firm‟s performance to its aspiration levels of performance functions as a
“master switch” that affects a wide range of organizational behaviors (Greve, 2003). The
behavioral theory of the firm predicts that when firm performance is above the aspiration level,
increases in firm performance lead to decreases in risk taking (Cyert & March, 1963). While
these effects have been supported empirically, the effects of performance below aspiration level
still remain under debate (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987; Ocasio 1995).
The behavioral theory predicts that when firm performance is below aspiration level, decreases
in firm performance lead to increases in risk taking (Cyert and March 1963). In contrast, some
researchers argue that performance below aspiration level is perceived as a threat, and that such a
perception makes decision makers rigid and unable to generate risky courses of action (Staw,
Sandelands, Dutton, 1981) – the so-called threat-rigidity thesis. In other words, low performance
induces risk aversion.
Attempting to reconcile these conflicting predictions for performance below aspiration level,
March and Shapira (1987, 1992) propose a model of risk taking that considers shifts in focus of
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attention by managers. As they put it, “understanding action in the face of incomplete
information may depend more on ideas about attention than on ideas about decision (p. 1412).”
Building upon a large body of literature in psychology of risk taking (e.g. Atkinson 1954; Lopes
1987) and decision theory (e.g. Tversky 1972), they contend that risk preference varies with
context, which is highly subject to managerial interpretation. Their model is based on two
reference points: the aspiration level and the survival level. They propose that managers first
attend to the level of performance relative to the aspiration level, or the attainment discrepancy
(Lant 1992). When performance is above aspiration level, managers are more likely to be risk
averse, which is consistent with the behavioral theory. However, when performance is below
aspiration level, managers will be either risk averse or risk seekers according to the survival
level, which is the point at which a firm‟s resources are exhausted. If the current performance is
below aspiration level but well above the survival point, the opportunities to fill the gap between
a low performance and the aspiration level are more salient than the dangers associated with risk
taking. Thus, decreases in performance lead to risk taking, which is again consistent with the
behavioral theory. On the other hand, when current performance is close to the survival point, the
dangers associated with risk taking become more salient than its opportunities, preventing
managers from pursuing risk. Thus, decreases in performance lead to risk aversion, which is
consistent with the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al. 1981).
The rules that govern the shift in the focus of attention between a survival point and an
aspiration level are an important aspect of the model. March and Shapira (1992) suggest that
slack resources can be drivers of focusing attention on the opportunities rather than on the
dangers. Large organizational slack lowers the survival point, whereas low slack raises it. Hence,
the distance between the aspiration level and the survival point for firms with large

44

organizational slack is greater than the distance for firms with low organizational slack.
Consequently, managers in resource-rich firms are more likely to perceive performance below
aspiration level as a repairable gap; therefore, in such conditions, performance below aspiration
level increases risk taking, which would be predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert
and March 1963). Conversely, managers in resource-poor firms perceive low performance as a
threat to firm survival (Audia & Greve, 2006), thus inducing risk aversion, which would be
predicted by the threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al. 1981).
In sum, the literature allows us to make predictions for each of the performance/slack
categories: (a) firm performance below their aspiration level and high slack, (b) firm
performance below their aspiration level and low slack (c) firm performance above aspiration
level. In the following sections, I integrate the behavioral theory of the firm into the multimarket
theory, proposing a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on market entry
and exit behavior.

3.2 Market Entry
Considered a strategic move, market entry is a risky decision, since it requires substantial
resource commitment and is more difficult to reverse (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Miller and
Chen 1994; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen 1991). In this section, I first present the mutual
forbearance null hypothesis for market entry in order to make the theoretical model complete,
and then develop three hypotheses. Each hypothesis addresses one of the possible
performance/slack categories: performance below aspiration level and high slack, performance
below aspiration level and low slack, performance above aspiration level, irrespective of slack
resources.
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3.2.1 The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market entry
The Industrial Organization perspective assumes that firms maximize a profit function while
taking into account the likely strategies of rivals (Scherer and Ross, 1980). If they are at all
perceptive, firms recognize that their pricing decisions are interdependent and their profits are
higher when they coordinate their prices than when they pursue their own self-interest (Tirole,
1988). Consequently, firms are motivated to engage in joint-profit maximizing strategies through
mutual forbearance (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). In terms of risk preference, the mutual
forbearance logic suggests that a firm‟s risk preference varies with its level of interdependence
with rivals or the competitive context in which the firm is embedded. At low levels of
multimarket contact, the threat of retaliation by rivals is minimal. Consequently, firms are
motivated to pursue risk. However, as the interdependence increases, firms change their risk
preference and avoid risk, thus forbearing from rivalry. Thus, the mutual forbearance logic
applied to market entry decisions assume that firms enter new markets at low levels of
multimarket contact. In order words, there is a negative relationship between multimarket
contact and risk preference.
This theoretical logic has been primarily built on the forbearance effect that is created once
multimarket contact levels are high. However, to create this deterrence capability, firms must
establish multimarket contact with their rivals (Korn and Baum, 1999). Hence, in the context of
market entry decisions, the recent mutual forbearance logic that emerges from empirical studies
proposes an inverted-U relationship between multimarket contact on one hand, and risk
preference with respect to market entry on the other (Baum and Korn, 1999; Haveman and
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Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan et al., 2003; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006). This relationship is
depicted in Figure 3.2 and set out as the mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market entry:
Hypothesis 0a (H0a): There will be an inverted-U-shaped relationship
between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its rivals and a firm’s rate
of market entry.

Market entry

Figure 3.2 – The Mutual Forbearance Null Hypothesis for Market Entry

MMC
deterrence

forbearance

The two parts of the curve describe the two sides of competitive interaction: the creation of
deterrence capability and the operation of forbearance. The inflection point indicates the
threshold of multimarket contact at which risk preference shifts from risk seeking to risk
avoidance: Below the threshold, firms are likely to pursue risk, and above the threshold, they are
likely to avoid risk. From an IO standpoint, this curve also represents the best combination of
risk avoidance and risk seeking behaviors that lead to maximization of profits (Edwards, 1955).
The IO logic assumes that firms abiding by the tacit agreements with rivals benefit from
decreased rivalry and, consequently accrue greater profitability (Porter, 1980).
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To integrate the behavioral logic into the forbearance logic I articulate how the three
predictions for performance relative to aspiration level impact the mutual forbearance logic (i.e.
the mutual forbearance null hypothesis). I develop three hypotheses that demonstrate how firm
performance feedback moderates the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry
decisions. An illustration of the hypothesized effects is provided in Figure 3.3. The mutual
forbearance null hypothesis (H0a) is represented as the dashed curve. The moderating effect of
performance relative to aspiration level and slack is represented as the skewed curve. The
skewed curves depict the competitive interactions after the introduction of bounded rationality
into the rational logic of the mutual forbearance hypothesis.

3.2.2 Performance below aspiration level and high slack
Abundant-slack firms performing below aspiration level are likely to take more risks than
limited-slack firms (March and Shapira, 1987, 1992). In taking more risks, they will consider
alternative strategies (Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser, 2000) in order to reduce or eliminate the
discrepancy between current performance and the aspiration level. Indeed, evidence suggests that
performance below aspiration levels has been related to larger magnitude of strategic changes
(Miller & Chen 1994; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; Audia, Locke, and Smith, 2000).
Taken together, these findings suggest that low-performing firms with high slack display high
tolerance to risk. Risky alternatives become more acceptable because the decision-maker is now
in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This suggests that poor-performing
multimarket firms with abundant slack will escalate the competition to higher levels. Hence, they
may take longer to forbear, because they will not be as much concerned with maintaining the
competitive equilibrium as they are with recovering from the shortfall. However, as rivals start

48

retaliating to this excessively aggressive behavior, the aggressive firms will tend to forbear from
further market entry, and again abide by the mutual interdependencies that their multimarket ties
represent. In sum, the interaction between performance below aspiration level and high slack
moderates the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry as it exacerbates the
expansionist motivation and pushes the threshold away from the point where it would be under
normal conditions. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.3(a) and stated in H1a:

Hypothesis 1 (H1a): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its
rivals on the firm’s rate of market entry will be amplified when the firm’s
performance is below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is high.

3.2.3 Firm performance below aspiration level and low slack
Contrary to resource-rich firms, resource-poor firms performing below aspiration level will be
risk-averse (Audia and Greve, 2006). A threat to survival results in restriction of information and
rigidity in strategic action (Staw et al., 1981). This suggests that low-performing, resource-poor
firms will pursue market entry very cautiously. First, those firms do not have slack resources to
enter into markets in order to create deterrence. Second, under conditions of adversity, low-slack
firms shift their focus of attention to the firm‟s internal activities (Hambrick and D‟Aveni, 1988).
Consequently, they start forbearing sooner than they would under normal conditions. In sum, the
interaction between performance below aspiration level and limited slack moderates the
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry as it diminishes the expansionist
motivation and moves the threshold to the left from the point where it should be under normal
conditions. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.3(b) and stated in H2a:
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Figure 3.3 – Market Entry and the Moderating Effects of Firm Performance and Organizational Slack
(b) Performance below aspiration
level, low slack

(c) Performance above aspiration
level
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(a) Performance below aspiration
level, high slack
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Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its
rivals on the firm’s rate of market entry will be attenuated when firm performance is
below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is limited.

3.2.4 Firm performance above aspiration level
Change is less likely to occur when the organization performs above the aspiration level
(Cyert and March, 1963). Studies have found that good past performance induces firms to carry
competitive repertoires characterized as having high levels of inertia (Miller and Chen, 1994)
and that financially successful firms are less likely to respond to competitive challenges
(Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996). Taken together, these findings suggest that high performing
firms seek stability in competitive practices. Although the rational view of mutual forbearance
suggests that firms coordinate their actions in order to maximize profits, from a behavioral
perspective, firms avoid uncertainty in order to obtain profits that satisfies the dominant coalition
(Cyert and March, 1963). The goal is to seek ways to make an uncertain environment
predictable. For example, firms enter markets of known competitors because they allow
managers to draw on their past experience regarding the competitive responses of better-known
rivals (Stephen et al., 2003).
High performing firms also tend to display recurring competitive patterns since success
reinforces past strategic decisions (Levitt and March, 1988). Hence, they are also less willing to
abandon the multimarket strategy that generated the performance in the first place (Greve, 1998).
Risk avoidance in this context means that high-performing firms have fewer incentives to disrupt
the tacit agreements that the multimarket structures represent. Indeed, multimarket contact
always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objectives are concave, that is to say when firms are risk
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averse (Spagnolo, 1999). Thus, because performance goals are satisfied, firms can attend to
competitive goals and abide by the focus on performance above aspiration level does not trigger
problemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963), and consequently, does not moderate the
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates. This relationship is depicted in
Figure 3.3(c) and stated in H3a:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Performance above aspiration does not moderate the
inverted-U-shaped relationship between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with
its rivals and a firm’s rate of market entry.

3.3 Market Exit
One of the most understudied behaviors in competitive dynamics is exit. Generally
speaking, if the assumptions of multimarket competition are valid, then they will be exhibited in
exit decisions similarly to entry decisions. Furthermore, the impact of performance relative to
aspiration level should also be seen in exit patterns.
In this section, I develop hypotheses regarding the moderating effect of firm performance
and organizational slack on market exit behavior. I first present the mutual forbearance null
hypothesis with respect to exit in order to make the theoretical model complete, and then develop
three hypotheses. Each hypothesis addresses one of the possible performance/organizational
slack categories: performance below aspiration level and high slack, performance below
aspiration level and low slack, and performance above aspiration level.

3.3.1 The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market exit
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The relationship between multimarket contact and market exit behavior is shown in Figure
3.4, representing the empirical evidence that firms are sensitive to their level of multimarket
contact with competitors when making market exit decisions (Baum and Korn 1996, Boeker et
al. 1997).

Market exit

Figure 3.4 – The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market exit

MMC

At low levels of multimarket contact with its competitors in a focal market, a focal firm does
not have an extended interdependence with them. Thus, when contemplating market exit, firms
opt to exit markets that do not provide a credible deterrent to rivals, because presence in such
markets does not enable firms to signal their ability to respond to future aggressions (Edwards
1955). However, as multimarket contact reaches higher levels, the motivation to exit from
markets is likely to decline. First, firms with a high level of multimarket contact with rivals have
the ability to signal deterrence. For instance, Gimeno (1999) found that airlines use a relatively
small presence in their rivals‟ hubs to reduce the competitive intensity of these rivals in their own
hub. As a result, maintaining footholds in markets with high multimarket contact leads to stable
market shares (Heggestad and Rhoades 1978) and reduced levels of competition in individual
markets (Scott 1982). Accordingly, all studies examining the relationship between multimarket
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contact and market exit decisions (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Boeker et al. 1997)
found that higher levels of multimarket contact are associated with lower exit rates.
Another aspect that contributes to lower exit rates is the fact that the prolonged presence in
markets with high multimarket contact may considerably raise exit barriers (Porter 1980).
Indeed, businesses which are of high strategic importance are difficult to be divested due to the
value created by non-capital investments (Harrigan 1980). Moreover, even if these markets do
not yield profitable margins, firms are unlikely to abandon them because of the crosssubsidization from profitable markets (Cho and Cohen 1997). The rationale behind a firm‟s
keeping footholds in markets with high multimarket contact is that the costs incurred in such
activity are justifiable, because decreased levels of rivalry lead to performance levels that would
be lower otherwise (Hughes & Oughton 1993; Evans & Kessides 1994; Jans & Rosenbaum
1996; Gimeno and Woo 1999). Thus, the arguments above can be summarized as the mutual
forbearance null hypothesis for market exit:
Hypothesis 0b (H0b): There is a negative relationship between a firm’s level of
multimarket contact with market incumbents and a firm’s rate of market exit, such
that firms with higher levels of multimarket contact with incumbents in a focal
market are less likely to exit that market than firms with lower levels of
multimarket contact.

In the next paragraphs, I develop hypotheses addressing the moderating effect of firm
performance and slack on the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. An
illustration of the hypothesized effects is shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5 – Market Exit and the Moderating Effects of Firm Performance and Organizational Slack
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3.3.2 Firm performance below aspiration level and high slack
According to the March-Shapira model (1992), the effects of performance below aspiration
level on risk taking differ depending on the level of organizational slack, in that high-resource
firms are risk-seekers, and low-resource firms are risk averse (Audia and Greve 2006). In the
context of market exit decisions, the decision to remain in a market is riskier than the decision to
exit from it (Shimizu 2007). Hence, high-resource firms performing below aspiration level have
incentives to remain rather than withdraw from markets. Not surprisingly, high-resource firms
divest not as often as low-resource firms when faced with the same performance gap (Chang
1996). Accordingly, research has found that high-resource firms are more likely to cut capacity
incrementally (Lieberman 1990), and also likely to hold physical assets idle but ready to resume,
a situation that affords recuperative flexibility that discourages competitor entry or expansion
(Harrigan 1985). These findings have implications for the expected market exit behavior under
the mutual forbearance null hypothesis.
According to the mutual forbearance null hypothesis, firms with low levels of multimarket
contact firms are more likely to exit from markets than firms with high levels of multimarket
contact (Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997). However, an increased propensity to take
risk is translated into a greater need to show deterrence capability, meaning that high-resource,
low-performing firms are less likely to exit from markets. Thus, the negative relationship
between multimarket contact and market exit rates is moderated by below-aspiration firm
performance and large slack. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.5(a) and stated in
Hypothesis 1b (H1b):
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The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market incumbents on the
firm’s rate of market exit will be attenuated when firm performance is below the
aspiration level and its level of slack is high

3.3.3 Firm performance below aspiration level and low slack
Contrary to high-resource firms, low-resource firms performing below aspiration level are
risk averse (March-Shapira 1992). Excessive pools of financial and managerial resources may
insulate high-resource firms from pressures to exit from current markets, but low-resource firms
are unable to buffer these pressures (Shimizu and Hitt 2005). Hence, as firm performance
decreases, the likelihood of exit increases (Duhaime and Grant 1984; Montgomery and Thomas
1988; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991; Chang 1996; Steiner 1997).
Low-resource firms liquidate and divest more subunits to generate cash (D‟Aveni 1989),
since they interpret decreases in performance as a threat to survival rather than a repairable gap
(Audia and Greve 2006). Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) suggest another incentive for lowresource firms to exit from markets. They noted that, although entry into other markets may not
be an available option for many poor performing firms, the exit option does not require such
capital investment. Hence, poorly performing firms may try to correct the problems by divesting
underperforming businesses without necessarily moving into new ones (Chang 1996).
Taken together, these ideas suggest that low-performing firms with limited resources pursue
market exit more vigorously than low-performing firms with abundant slack do. Furthermore,
since the exit process involves stages and complexities that create great potential for experience
and learning curve benefits (Lieberman 1987, 1989), low-resource firms gain experience with
sell-offs and divestitures. Consequently, they will continue to use them (Bergh and Lim 2008).
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Yet they maintain footholds in some markets. When faced with increasing uncertainty,
corporate-level managers are pressured to direct their resources toward the individual business
lines they understand best (Jones & Hill, 1988). Hence, peripheral markets would receive less
attention and preference than core markets (Bergh 1998). By extension, as low-slack firms are
risk averse, they prefer to remain in core markets such as markets with high levels of
multimarket contact, since the potential for deterrence is higher in such markets (Baum and Korn
1996). These arguments suggest that the negative relationship between multimarket contact and
market exit rates is moderated by below-aspiration firm performance and low slack. This
relationship is depicted in Figure 3.5(b) and set out as Hypothesis 2b:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market
incumbents on the firm’s rate of market exit will be amplified when the firm’s
performance is below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is limited

3.3.4 Firm performance above aspiration level
As predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm, risk taking is less likely when firms
perform above aspiration level (Cyert & March 1963). High performing firms also tend to
display recurring competitive patterns because success reinforces past strategic decisions (March
and Levitt 1988) and induces firms to carry competitive repertoires characterized as having high
levels of inertia (Miller and Chen 1994). Being risk averse, high-performing firms are more
likely to maintain footholds in „safe‟ markets: markets with high levels of multimarket contact,
due to high-performing firms‟ ability to signal deterrence to rivals. This rationale is similar to the
mutual forbearance null hypothesis which predicts that firms are less likely to remain in markets
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with low levels of multimarket contact, but more likely to remain in markets with high levels
(Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, Boeker et al. 1997).
Risk avoidance also means that high-performing firms have fewer incentives to disrupt the
tacit agreements that the multimarket structures represent. Accordingly, Spagnolo (1999) found
that multimarket contact always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objectives are concave, that is
to say when firms are risk averse. Hence, high performing firms are likely to display a
competitive behavior that resembles the one predicted by the mutual forbearance null hypothesis.
Thus, performance above aspiration level regardless of the level of slack does not appear to
affect the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. This relationship is depicted
in Figure 3.5(c) and set out as Hypothesis 3b:
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Performance above aspiration does not moderate the
negative relationship between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market
incumbents and a firm’s rate of market exit.

3.4 Conclusion
In my dissertation I integrate the behavioral theory of the firm into the multimarket theory,
proposing a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on market entry and exit
behaviors. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses. I argue that the relationship between
multimarket contact and market entry and exit behavior is influenced by performance relative to
aspiration level and the level of slack resources, and then make predictions for each of the
performance/slack categories as follows.
For performance below aspiration level and high slack, I hypothesize that their interaction
amplifies the effect of multimarket contact on market entry rates, but attenuates the effect of
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multimarket contact on market exit. For performance below aspiration level and low slack, I
hypothesize that their interaction attenuates the effect of multimarket contact on market entry,
but amplifies the effect on market exit. Finally, I hypothesize that performance above aspiration
level does not moderate either the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry, or
the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit.

Table 3.1 – Summary of hypotheses
Moderators

Market Entry

Market Exit

Null hypothesis (baseline
model)

H0a: There will be an inverted-Ushaped relationship between a firm‟s
level of multimarket contact with its
rivals and a firm‟s rate of market entry

H0b: There is a negative relationship
between a firm‟s level of multimarket
contact with market incumbents and a
firm‟s rate of market exit

Performance below
aspiration level and high
slack

H1a: The impact of a firm‟s level of
multimarket contact with its rivals on
the firm‟s rate of market entry will be
amplified when the firm‟s performance
is below the aspiration level and its
level of slack resources is high

H1b: The impact of a firm‟s level of
multimarket contact with market
incumbents on the firm‟s rate of market
exit will be attenuated when firm
performance is below the aspiration
level and its level of slack resources is
high

Performance below
aspiration level and low
slack

H2a: The impact of a firm‟s level of
multimarket contact with its rivals on
the firm‟s rate of market entry will be
attenuated when firm performance is
below the aspiration level and its level
of slack resources is limited

H2b: The impact of a firm‟s level of
multimarket contact with market
incumbents on the firm‟s rate of market
exit will be amplified when the firm‟s
performance is below the aspiration
level and its level of slack resources is
limited

Performance above
aspiration level,
irrespective of the level of
slack resources

H3a: Performance above aspiration
does not moderate the inverted-Ushaped relationship between a firm‟s
level of multimarket contact with its
rivals and a firm‟s rate of market entry

H3b: Performance above aspiration does
not moderate the negative relationship
between a firm‟s level of multimarket
contact with market incumbents and a
firm‟s rate of market exit
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH CONTEXT

The previous chapter proposes a theoretical model of behavioral boundary conditions for the
mutual forbearance hypothesis regarding market entry and exit. In this chapter I describe the
contextual setting in which the theoretical model will be tested. First, I present the research
requirements and challenges for testing the theoretical model. Next, I explain why the U.S.
property and liability insurance industry is an appropriate empirical setting, and concluding the
chapter, I provide a brief description of the industry.

4.1 Selecting a contextual setting for empirical analysis
4.1.1 Research requirements
To ensure that the empirical results of the study have statistical validity, I must select an
empirical setting in which the conditions for multimarket competition are more likely to be
satisfied. First, the empirical setting must be characterized by multimarket firms, that is to say,
firms operating in several market segments. Another condition is extended interdependence
between competitors, which occurs as firms encounter the same competitors across multiple
markets. This condition is crucial as it facilitates forbearance behavior, when firms tacitly
coordinate their competitive actions in order to achieve decreased rivalry and, consequently,
enhanced performance. Moreover, the testing of the model also requires longitudinal data
because the recognition of extended interdependence arises as a result of repeated interaction
over time.
One of the assumptions of the theoretical model is that intensity of rivalry is not a quality of
industry structure but varies from market to market according to the set of competitors operating

61

in each specific market. Because the source of competition for a firm within a market must be the
set of competitors in that market, the empirical setting must be characterized by no crosselasticity across markets (i.e. products or services offered to different markets are not close
substitutes), and by homogenous products or services (i.e. firms competing with little
differentiation). Moreover, clearly delimited market boundaries facilitate the identification of
incumbents and potential entrants to a given market. Since the dissertation focus is on a specific
competitive behavior – market entry and exit decisions – it is equally important that the
empirical setting be characterized by market entry and exit activity. The empirical setting must
have intrafirm coordination mechanisms that enable firms to recognize the level of multimarket
contact with their rivals and act accordingly (Golden and Ma 2003; Jayachandran et al 1999).
According to Gimeno and Woo (1999), multimarket competition theory may be most
relevant under conditions of resource sharing among market units and under conditions of related
diversification or geographic expansion. Hence, empirical analysis of product or geographic
diversification within a single industry seems warranted. Indeed, Stephan et al. (2003) caution
that inflection points, i.e. the point at which the relationship between multimarket contact levels
and the rate of competitive entry switches from a positive one to a negative one, are likely to be
unique to each industry.
Heterogeneity in the dependent and independent variables is also a necessary condition.
Because the model predicts relationships between continuous variables, the empirical context
must provide enough variance in multimarket contact (e.g. from low to high levels), competitive
behavior (e.g. from mild to intense entry and exit activity), as well as variance in firm
performance and slack.
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In sum, the empirical context for testing the theoretical model must satisfy the following
conditions: multimarket firms, interdependence between competitors, internal coordination
mechanisms, longitudinal data, no cross-elasticity across markets, homogenous products, clearly
delimited market boundaries, market entry and exit activity, single industry, and heterogeneity in
the dependent and independent variables.

4.1.2 The U.S. property and liability insurance industry
The U.S. property and liability insurance industry offers an appropriate research context for
empirical analysis of this dissertation‟s theoretical model, since it satisfies all conditions above
mentioned. First, the property-liability insurance industry is characterized by multimarket firms,
selling several insurance products and operating across a few or several states. Extended
interdependence becomes characteristic of this industry because insurers are likely to encounter
the same competitors in several product and geographic markets in which they operate.
Consequently, their fortunes are interrelated.
The condition that market boundaries must be clearly delimited is attained as market
segments can be either geographic (the 50 states and D.C.) or product markets (lines of
businesses such as personal auto and homeowners insurance). In prior empirical studies on
multimarket competition, researchers have investigated mutual forbearance in one-dimensional
markets – either geographic (e.g. airlines city-pair routes) or product markets (e.g. hospital
services). The U.S. insurance industry offers the opportunity to examine multimarket
competition across two-dimensional markets, i.e. geo-product markets (D‟Aveni 2001).
Despite being regulated, the property-liability insurance industry possesses the structural
characteristics normally associated with the idealized competitive market: a large number of
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firms, operating in markets with low concentration levels, and selling essentially identical
products in some lines of business (Joskow 1973). Moreover, entry and exit barriers appear to be
low as the capital requirements of a company seeking to become incorporated or enter a state
where it has not been licensed previously are not very high. For example, state fixed minimum
capital requirements average in the area of $2 million, which most insurers easily meet (Best‟s
Review 2007). Thus, market entry and exit activity is found in this industry. Moreover, because
these decisions define a firm‟s scope, they are centralized at the corporate level. Thus, the
condition of internal coordination is satisfied.
The single industry condition is also satisfied as the insurance industry provides opportunity
for related product and geographic diversification to be examined. Expectations for economies
of scope in the insurance industry are largely attributable to the ability to cross-sell products,
generate cost savings, create hybrid products, enhance brand image, and develop new sales
channels.
In the property-liability insurance industry, there is no cross-elasticity across markets, since
products serve particular needs and are not close substitutes. For instance, homeowners insurance
is not a substitute for personal auto insurance. Moreover, product homogeneity is also present in
this industry. The product itself – the policy – is essentially identical from company to company
within a market since most policy forms are mandated by state law. Indeed, many customers
view insurance products as commodities for which price matters more than service (A. M. Best,
2007).
Heterogeneity in the dependent and independent variables is another condition satisfied with
this industry as the property-liability segment provides a diverse context for research, with firms
of all sizes and performance levels. Also, because of the multitude of product and geographic
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markets, the industry is characterized by firms with different levels of contact and entailing
different market entry and exit patterns. Finally, since every insurer operating in the U.S. needs
to comply with filing regulations, the quality of data is very high and longitudinal data at the
most disaggregated level are available.
Although the theoretical model of this dissertation does not establish whether it assumes full
or imperfect observability (Matsushima 2001), this study provides a strong test of mutual
forbearance under conditions of imperfect observability, since information about prices and
quality is not readily available (Greve 2008b).

4.2 The U.S property and liability insurance industry
4.2.1 Industry overview
The insurance mechanism focuses primarily on uncertainty regarding the chance that a
particular loss will occur (Joskow 1973). From a business perspective, the costs associated with
uncertainty can discourage business growth, whereas from a customer perspective, uncertainty
over the financial consequences of loss to homes or autos can affect spending levels. Thus, by
transferring the potential financial consequences of their loss exposures to an insurer, businesses
and individuals can minimize the effects of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, the products sold by
the insurance industry are purchased by virtually all economic agents in the U.S. economy.
The insurance industry constitutes a large part of the financial services sector in the U.S.,
providing nearly some 2.3 million jobs, or 2.1 percent of U.S. employment. Insurers also
contribute more than $250 billion to the nation‟s gross domestic product (Insurance Information
Institute 2006).
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The insurance industry in the U.S. is divided into two broad categories, life insurance and
property-liability insurance. Property-liability insurance, which is the focus of this dissertation,
covers direct losses from damage to property, indirect losses resulting from direct losses (e.g.,
loss of income from damages to a business facility), and loss of possession. Coverage is provided
to both personal and commercial customers; the former include individuals, and the latter,
business policyholders.
The property and liability insurance industry has grown significantly over the last 30 years.
Table 4.1 provides historical trends of the property-liability insurance industry. Between 1970
and 2005, the assets of property-liability insurers increased from $55 billion to $1.4 trillion. At
the same time, total premium increased from $36 billion to $475 billion. In terms of profitability,
insurers have experienced „good‟ years (e.g. 13.1 percent in 1980) and „bad‟ years (i.e. 6.8
percent in 2000).
Table 4.1 – Property and Liability Insurance Trends

Assets ($M)
Premiums Written ($M)
Return (%)
Number of firms

1970
55
36,524
11.6
2,800

1980
198
108,745
13.1
2,953

1990
556
252,991
8.5
3,899

2000
1,034
341,590
6.8
3,215

2005
1,398
475,200
10.4
2,700

Source: A.M. Best and Insurance Information Institute

The number of firms in the industry consistently increased between 1970 and 1990.
However, it began to drop in the 1990s, as the industry experienced a wave of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As). The M&A wave was driven in part by advances in technology (Graham,
Loftin, Xie, and Xiaoying, 2007), but the wave also coincides with a period of relative prosperity
in the industry, which experienced high capitalization and low leverage during most of the period
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(Cummins and Xie 2008). The industry is still characterized by a significant number of small
insurers selling insurance products in limited geographic areas, but the top 200 insurers in the
industry write 95% of the premiums in the property-liability insurance (Best‟s Review 2007).
Although the insurance business is associated with increased financial risk – both
impairment and insolvency (the insurance‟s world equivalent of bankruptcy) have been relatively
rare. Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of insurer impairment over the 1976-2005 period. Average
annual rates of impairment were about one in 120 companies. The dominant causes of
impairment have remained constant for over 30 years: deficient loss reserves, inadequate pricing,
and rapid growth (A.M. Best Special Report 2006).
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

0.30%
0.44%
0.39%
0.62%
0.30%
0.52%
0.45%
0.41%
1.13%
1.54%
0.98%
1.01%
1.49%
1.48%
1.63%
1.74%
1.69%
1.18%
0.83%
0.46%
0.35%
0.89%
0.50%
0.54%
1.48%
1.49%
1.34%
1.02%
0.49%
0.32%

Figure 4.1 – U.S. Property-Liability Insurers, Annual Impairment Rate, 1976-2005
Source: A.M. Best, 2007, The guide to understanding the insurance industry.
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4.2.2 Property liability insurance products
The property-liability insurance industry encompasses several lines of business:
homeowners, personal auto, commercial auto, fire and allied, commercial multiple peril,
farmowners multiple peril, ocean marine, inland marine, financial and mortgage guaranty, surety
and fidelity, medical malpractice, workers‟ compensation, group accident and health, general
liability, theft, boiler and machinery, and other miscellaneous property/casualty.
Table 4.2 shows the structure of the property-liability insurance in 2007. Premiums written
(PW) represent the revenues for insurance companies. Although consisting of several business
lines, the property-liability insurance industry has an uneven distribution of revenues across
markets.
Table 4.2 – Premiums Written by Business Line in 2007

64
51
52

%
M.S.
Top 2
Writers
28.9%
33.0%
26.0%

%
M.S.
Top 10
Writers
60%
64%

Leading
Writer

%
M.S.

State Farm
State Farm
AIG

17.5%
21.7%
19.2%

%
Writer's
Total
PW
34.6%
28.8%
31.5%

Allstate
Allstate
Zurich
Liberty
Mutual

11.3%
11.3%
6.8%

%
Writer's
Total
PW
37.0%
11.3%
27.3%

10.2%

62

23.6%

53%

AIG

12.4%

19.5%

11.2%

28.0%

35

7.2%

41

15.0%

48%

Travelers

9.1%

14.6%

Hartford

5.9%

18.2%

29
14

5.9%
3.0%

54
36

14.0%
17.5%

Travelers
CNA

7.7%
9.0%

7.6%
14.9%

6.5%
8.5%

13.5%
3.9%

AIG

16.7%

5.9%

8.6%

30.8%

18.5%

53.4%

9.0%

3.0%

7.4%

5.0%

AIG

6.9%

2.2%

17.1%

14.9%

Centurion

16.7%

99.7%

24.6%

100.0%

Radian

17.0%

84.2%

27.3%
20.7%

Citizens
Berkshire
Hathaway
Ace INA
Mortgage
Guar
Travelers
AIG

Progressive
AIG
Assurant
Solutions
AIG

Fire

11

2.3%

32

25.3%

Allied

11

2.2%

36

27.5%

Medical Malpractice

10

2.1%

39

14.3%

Multiple Peril Crop

7

1.4%

57

33.8%

Mortgage Guaranty

6

1.2%

95

41.6%

Surety
Product Liability
Group Accident and
Health
Ocean Marine
Financial Guaranty
Farmowners Multiple
Peril

5
4

1.1%
0.8%

18
37

18.9%
12.3%

4.6%
1.5%

8.4%
8.4%

3.4%
2.5%

57

36.6%

AIG

27.1%

3.0%

9.5%

28.0%

0.6%
0.6%

46
135

22.9%
50.9%

AIG
Ambac Fin

13.2%
28.3%

1.3%
99.1%

Zurich
Zurich
Federated
Mutual
Travelers
MBIA

3

0.7%

3
3

9.7%
22.6%

1.4%
100.0%

3

0.5%

59

15.2%

Nationwide

8.5%

1.4%

State Farm

6.7%

0.4%

Federal Flood

3

0.5%

12

31.7%

Fidelity
National

17.5%

72.8%

State Farm

14.2%

0.8%

Business Line

PW
($M)

% Total
PW

Loss
Ratio

Personal Auto
Homeowners
Other Liability

162
63
52

33.2%
13.0%
10.7%

Worker‟s Compensation

50

Commercial Multiple
Peril
Commercial Auto
Inland Marine

42%

2nd
Leading
Writer

%
M.S.
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Earthquake

2

0.5%

-2

30.3%

CA
Earthquake

20.7%

100.0%

State Farm

9.6%

0.5%

Aircraft

2

0.5%

46

41.6%

AIG

28.9%

2.1%

Berkshire
Hathaway

12.7%

1.9%

Other Accident and
Health

2

0.4%

79

63.8%

State Farm

40.8%

1.6%

CNA

23.0%

5.0%

Credit

2

0.3%

95

32.8%

AIG

18.6%

1.0%

14.2%

7.3%

Fidelity
Boiler and Machinery
Burglary and Theft
Miscellaneous
TOTAL

1
1
0.2
3
488

0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
0.6%
100.0%

36
31
16
101

36.6%
42.8%
40.4%

Chubb
FM Global
Travelers

20.6%
25.5%
20.9%

2.5%
11.1%
0.2%

16.0%
17.3%
19.5%

0.9%
0.6%
0.3%

Old
Republic
Travelers
AIG
Chubb

Source: Best‟s Review (August, 2008)

Half of the premiums written in the industry are spread over more than twenty markets,
whereas two lines – personal auto and homeowners – concentrate almost half of the total
premiums written. In these markets, two firms have a large share – State Farm and Allstate,
being responsible for almost a third of the total premiums written in each market. These firms‟
stakes in these markets are also high – approximately two thirds of State Farm‟s premiums and
half of Allstate‟s premiums are written in these markets. Interestingly, some firms pursue a
nearly dominant business strategy in some markets (e.g. financial and mortgage guaranty,
earthquake, and multiple peril crop), whereas others have a diversified business scope.

4.2.3 Insurance operations
4.2.3.1 Organizational forms
Any firm within the insurance industry has three important functions: the manager function
– the decision makers who establish the corporate strategy; the owner function – those who
provide capital and bear risks; and the customer function – the policyholders who pay the
premiums. The organizational forms within the insurance industry – stock, mutual and Lloyds –
differ in the manner in which they combine these three functions.
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In stock companies, the distinguishing characteristic is the potentially complete separation of
the manager, owner, and customer functions. These companies are the most prevalent type of
proprietary insurer in the U.S. In mutual companies, the policyholders are both customers and
owners. This type of insurer is formed to provide insurance at a minimum cost to policyholders,
who own the insurer. Generally, it is assumed that the stock and mutual companies have different
goals, as the former seeks to maximize profits, whereas the latter seeks to minimize
administrative costs and insurance losses, because mutual firms are formed to provide insurance
at a minimum cost to policyholders.
Lloyds are another kind of organizational form. They are not an insurance company, but a
marketplace such as a stock exchange. In Lloyds, syndicates of members typically underwrite
policies, and members delegate the day-to-day management to the syndicate manager. Thus, the
manager and the owner functions are merged. Yet a very prominent organizational form overseas
(e.g. the Lloyds of London provide complex coverage for marine insurance), American Lloyds
account for a very small amount of U.S. premiums, most localized in the state of Texas.

4.2.3.2. Organizational actors
As in agency theory, an agent represents the insurer (“the principal”) in the performance of
some function. Legally, an agent can be either an employee of the principal or an independent
contractor. The term broker is reserved for independent contractors who represent policyholders
in dealing with insurers. In effect, a broker acts as an agent of the policyholder. Another actor in
insurance marketing is a producer, defined as a person who sells insurance to customers.
Producers can be employees of insurers, agents, or brokers.
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4.2.3.3. Value chain
The insurance business is complex and a considerable amount of expertise is required to
successfully operate an insurer. Insurers perform three core functions to meet their goals:
marketing, underwriting, and claims. Other functions are: Loss control, Reinsurance, Actuarial,
Investments, Information Technology, Human Resources, Accounting, and Legal Services.

Marketing and distribution systems. Marketing involves determining what products or
services customers want and need and delivering them to those customers. Once the marketing
plan has been developed, insurers market their products and services through distribution
systems. Property-liability insurance can be distributed through an independent agency system,
exclusive agency system, and direct writer system. The independent agency and brokerage
system use producers who are independent contractors and are free to represent as many or as
few insurers as they want. The exclusive agency also uses producers who are independent
contractors, but they are restricted by contract to representing a single insurer. The direct writer
system uses producers who are employees of the insurers they represent.
No one distribution channel meets the needs of all insurers and all insurance customers. The
independent agency and brokerage system is likely to attract buyers who have complex insurance
needs or consider quality of service more important than cost. For example, it is used to market
lines of commercial insurance since these lines require more direct involvement from the
producer. On the other hand, the exclusive agency and direct writer system are used more
frequently for personal insurance. Since the insurance industry is very competitive, insurers find
it advantageous to use multiple distribution channels, including internet.
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Underwriting. The underwriting department‟s responsibility is to determine whether the
applications received meet the guidelines established by the insurer. The department‟s goal is to
write a profitable book of business for the insurer. Underwriters work with the marketing
department to accept those accounts most likely to produce a profit for the insurer. However,
underwriting liability presents many challenges for underwriters. Legislation and court decisions
require frequent changes to policy forms and underwriting guidelines. Such an environment
requires underwriters to keep up to date with emerging issues.

Claims. The first goal of the claim function is to satisfy the insurer‟s obligations to the
policyholder as set forth in the insurance policy. Following a loss, the promise of the insuring
agreement to pay, defend, or indemnify in the event of a covered loss is fulfilled (A. M. Best,
2007). The second goal is supporting the insurer‟s profit goal, which means that the claims
function help insurers achieve an underwriting profit through controlling expenses. The claim
function also provides valuable information to other departments such as marketing,
underwriting, and actuarial.

4.2.4. Regulation
The insurance industry is regulated at the state and federal levels. State insurance
departments implement specific directives from the legislature, extending from incorporation to
liquidation and encompassing several activities in between. Two important functions of state
insurance regulators are solvency and market regulation. Rejda (1998) notes that there are two
primary reasons for regulators‟ concern with insurer solvency. First, due to the nature of the
insuring agreement, premiums are paid prior to the payment of any loses that may arise. Hence,
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regulation reduces the possibility that future losses will not be paid. Second, through solvency,
the economic hardship policy holders would suffer as a result of failure of an insurer can be
reduced. Regulators limit insolvency risk by requiring insurers to maintain a minimum amount of
capital and surplus and meet other financial requirements.
It is important to distinguish between limiting insolvencies and preventing insolvency, as
well as to understand their potential consequences. Limiting insolvency risk implies that some
insurers may become insolvent as failure is likely to occur in any competitive market (Joskow
1973). On the other hand, preventing any insolvency from occurring would make the regulation
very stringent, thus leading firms to constrain their investments to reduce the likelihood of
failure. The result would be high insurance prices and inefficient markets, a situation that
regulation attempts to prevent in the first place (Redja, 1998).
Market regulation is another function of state insurance regulators. The fundamental
objective is to promote the proper functioning of insurance markets to serve the interest of
consumers and society (Joskow 1973). For the personal property-liability lines, half of the U.S.
states require rates to be filed and receive prior approval before they go into effect, whereas other
states rely on competition to regulate prices (Klein, 1995).
A recurring issue in market regulation is whether insurance markets are competitive.
Research on the effects of rate regulation has generally found that prior approval systems do not
have a strong effect on premium levels or profitability (Klein, 1995). In other words, markets
with prior approval systems and competitive rating tend to perform similarly on average.
Throughout its history, the insurance industry in the U.S. has seen several regulatory acts
that either tighten or relax the norms. The latest act regulating financial services industry,
including insurers, was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB Act). Also know as the
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Financial Services Modernization Act, the GLB Act revolutionized the way that providers of
goods and services within the financial services industry do business. A bank, an insurer, and a
securities firm are now allowed to affiliate under common ownership and offer customers a wide
array of financial services products. This act resulted in the entry of banking institutions into the
insurance industry as sellers and distributors of insurance products. On the other hand, more than
eight years later, few insurance carriers have realized their goals in selling banking products
through their vast agency networks (Best‟s Review September 2008).
The debate over state versus federal regulation has also been a persistent issue in the
insurance industry. Those who support regulation at the state level argue that this state regulation
is more responsive to local needs and that federal regulation would dilute states‟ rights. On the
other hand, proponents of federal regulation argue that the centralization would make regulation
more efficient and uniform. According to the 2009 state regulatory budgets to the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, regulatory spending varies significantly nationwide,
ranging from a high of $30 per resident in Delaware to a low of $2 per resident in 11 other states.
Overall, the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia are projected to spend more than $1.54
billion in 2009 on the regulation of insurance. Congress is now weighing proposals to create a
federal regulatory option for insurance, particularly since insurance regulation has proven to be a
profit center for most states. For example, states collected $2.58 billion in fees and penalties
imposed on companies last year, providing a “regulatory surplus” of nearly $1.2 billion.
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CHAPTER 5 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Data source and operationalization
The data for the property liability insurance industry comes from the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) annual statements. They include information concerning both
private and public firms operating in the property and liability insurance segment in the U.S.,
including statutory filing data on income statements, balance sheets, and other insurance-related
aspects of the business. The data contain the breakdown of premiums written and losses incurred
from 22 property-liability product lines in the U.S. 50 states and the District of Columbia. All
insurance companies operating in the U.S. are required to file this statement annually. Thus, the
database contains annual information on the entire population of firms in the U.S. propertyliability insurance industry.
The annual statement for each firm is made up of 95 reports. These reports are recorded as
large text files, and I subsequently, imported them into SAS data sets. Before running any
statistical analysis, I needed to extract the information from these data sets and create a database
that contains data on every dependent, independent, and control variables of the study. SAS
software provides two programming languages for data set manipulation: DATA step and
Structured Query Language (SQL). DATA step is a group of SAS programming statements used
for reading, combining, and modifying data sets. SQL is a standardized, widely used language
that uses relational algebra for data retrieval and updating. In SQL, the data sets are considered
collection of objects or tables and SQL provides a natural language to establish relationships
among the tables.
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Although more complex and requiring more training than SAS DATA step, SQL has more
functionalities that provide flexibility in terms of programming and data management. For
example, while SAS DATA step manipulates the data sets sequentially, with SQL it is possible
to create indexes that provide quicker access to data. Indices can be created on any combination
of attributes on a table. Queries that filter using those attributes can find matching records
randomly using the index, without having to check each record in turn. Another advantage is that
the relationships established between tables eliminate the duplication of data, which in turn
prevents data manipulation anomalies and loss of data integrity.
In order to create the study‟s database, I developed a group of SQL programs that performed
the following tasks: (1) data gathering from annual statements, (2) sample selection; (3)
calculation of measures; (4) creation of observations; and (5) data consolidation for subsequent
statistical analysis.
(1) Data gathering. There is a particular layout of the data for each report of the NAIC annual
statement. The first task is then to identify the source file in the annual statement database that
contains the data I need. Next, I develop SAS programs that read the annual statement database
and that record the chosen variables in relational tables. The resulting tables are the input for the
subsequent programs.
(2) Sample selection. Multimarket contact – one of the most important measures in the study –
is a relational measure, as it takes into account the overlap of contacts that a focal firm has with
incumbents outside the focal market. Hence, the group of firms to be considered competitors, i.e.
the sample of firms must be defined before the measure is calculated. Consequently, whenever
the sample criteria change, the measure needs to be recalculated. The criteria for sample
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selection are described in section 5.2. The SQL program deletes the insurers that do not meet the
criteria, creating the input for the next program.
(3) Calculation of measures. This SQL program calculates the measures of the study (e.g.
multimarket contact, Herfindhal index, aspiration levels, density, market experience, etc). The
calculation is described in section 5.2. The results are stored in SQL tables to be used in the next
process.
(4) Creation of observations. The SAS program reads the SQL tables previously recorded and
create individual observations (rows) containing values for the dependent, independent, and
control variables.
(5) Data consolidation. The SAS program combines the individual tables recorded for each year
into a single file for Stata sofware. Since there is an individual NAIC database for each year of
observation, I must run steps 1 through 4 twenty times, one for each year of observation.
Because processing time increases exponentially with the number of firms and years of
observation, the process would take on average 20 hours to complete in a regular single
processor computer. Thus, in order to optimize time and resources, I run the SAS programs in an
IBM System p5, a supercomputer suitable for research computing.

5.2. Sample
This dissertation encompasses data for the 1998-2008 period. The potential sample of firms
consists of all property-liability insurers writing two specific types of insurance: homeowners
and private passenger automobile insurance. These lines were chosen because they are B2C
(Business to Consumer) transactions, representing almost half of total book-of-business in
property-liability insurance industry. Firms operating in these markets are likely to compete
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head-to-head with little differentiation, whereas B2B (Business to Business) lines require
specialized underwriting capabilities, which may mask the effects of multimarket contact. Since
there are 51 geographic markets (50 states and D.C.) and 2 product markets (homeowners and
private passenger automobile), the maximum number of geo-product markets in this study is 102
geo-product markets.
Insurance companies may be structured as a single insurer or as an affiliate of an insurance
group. For example, a single insurer may operate in several states, or an insurance group may set
up multiple affiliates to cover different geographic areas or types of business. Since this
dissertation examines the scope of geo-product markets served by each insurance company
regardless of how the company is structured – as a single insurer or as a set of affiliated
companies – I consolidated single insurers that belong to the same group as one observation unit
in my sample. In the case where multiple insurers are grouped as one unit, the values for dummy
variables are based on the lead insurer in the group, and continuous variables (e.g. assets,
premiums, etc) are constructed by aggregating values of all firms in the group.
Insurers with negative assets or negative values on any other important financial information
(e.g. surplus or revenues) were deleted. Moreover, following cut-off criteria commonly used in
property-liability insurance research (e.g. Choi Weiss 2005), I deleted firms with a low market
share, because very small companies are less likely to have a significant impact on price and
supply in the state market. The final sample consists of approximately 93 firms per year,
representing 91% of revenues and 90% of assets of the firms writing homeowners and private
auto insurance. The sample consisted of 94.795 firm-year-observations between 1999 and 20081.
The data take the form of one observation per firm per market segment per year.

1

The observations for year 1998 are lost because of the lagging of all independent variables by one year.
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Figures 5.1 through 5.2 shows trends in the industry over the decade covered by this
analysis. Total revenues have increased over the years, whereas the number of firms competing
in the industry has varied. On average, firms operate in 15 markets per year. The sample contains
25% of mutual firms and 75% of stock firms.
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Figure 5.1 –Total revenue (premiums earned) per year
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Figure 5.2 – Number of firms per year

5.3. Measurement
5.3.1. Dependent Variables
- Market entry: This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable. For each market a
company can potentially enter in each year, a value of one is represented in the event of entry
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into the geo-product market by that company in that year. A value of zero indicates that no entry
was made by the company into the particular geo-product market during the year. I adopted the
assumption that each company of the sample can potentially enter any of the markets in which it
is not operating.
- Market exit: This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable. For each geo-product
market a company is operating in each year, a value of one indicates exit from the focal market
by that company in the following year. A value of zero indicates that the company continues to
operate in that particular geo-product market in the following year. That means that I adopted the
assumption that each company of the sample can potentially exit from any of the markets in
which it is currently operating. I define market exit as a firm‟s withdrawal from a market,
irrespective of exit mode (e.g. divestiture). To identify exit, I compare a firm‟s portfolio of
markets in year t with a firm‟s portfolio of markets in year t-1.

5.3.2. Independent Variables
- Multimarket contact: As described in Chapter 2, when choosing a measure of multimarket
contact, one must make decisions regarding level of analysis, scaling, and weighing. Multimarket
contact can be measured at several levels: dyadic, firm-in-market, firm-, and market levels
(Gimeno & Jeong 2001). I opt to use the firm-market level measure because it captures the
extent to which a firm‟s scope of business, outside of a focal market, is similar to other firms
competing in that market. Multimarket contact at the dyad level is not appropriate for this study
because I cannot determine the specific competitor toward whom a specific market entry or exit
decision is aimed (Gimeno and Jeong 2001). Regarding scaling, I opt to scale the measure since
scaling allows me to distinguish between a firm with 4 markets shared with rivals out of a
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possible total of 4 in which it currently competes, and one that shares 4 markets out of a total of
40. Thus, I calculate the average percentage of markets that a focal company shares with the
firms already competing in the focal market. Finally, I opt to weigh the measure according to the
importance of the overlapping markets to the focal market. For example, the focal company A
can potentially enter the state of Georgia in which companies B and C are already operating. If
company A also meets with company B in the state of New York, which represents 80% of
company A‟s revenues, as well as meets with company C in the state of Arizona, which
represents 20% of company A‟s revenues, then A‟s contact with B would be more important than
A‟s contact with C. The weight is the percentage of the focal firm‟s premium written obtained in
the market. The measure is defined as:

MMCimt 

 ( I
j i m

imt

 I jmt )  w imt

I

imt

m

where MMCimt is the multimarket contact of firm i in market m at time t; I imt is an indicator
variable set equal to one if firm i is active in market m at time t and zero otherwise; I jmt is an
indicator variable set equal to one if firm j is active in market m at time t and zero otherwise; and
w imt is the weight of market m for the focal firm I at time t relative to all markets it operates.

- Firm performance: Previous studies with samples of insurance firms have used loss ratio as a
measure of profitability (e.g. Greve, 2008a), which captures the firm‟s underwriting
performance. I use a form of operating ratio to gauge an insurer‟s profitability, which combines
both underwriting and investment results. It is important that investment results be considered
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because insurance firms generate substantial amounts of investable funds, and the return on
investments may offset unprofitable underwriting activities in a given year. Operating ratio is
calculated as follows:
Operating Ratio = (Loss Ratio + Expense Ratio) – Investment Income Ratio
where

LossesIncurred  LossAdjustmentExpenses
Pr emiumsEarned
ExpensesIncurred
Expense Ratio =
Pr emiumsWritten
NetInvestmentIncome
Investment Income Ratio =
Pr emiumsEarned

Loss Ratio =

Data from income statements and balance sheets are used to calculate these ratios. When a firm
has an operating ratio of less than 100, this indicates that it is able to generate a profit from its
operations and investments. I subtracted the operating ratio from 100 percent so that the measure
can reflect the percentage profit margin.

- Aspiration level: I calculated the measure of aspiration level as a mixture of past-period
aspiration level and the previous performance of the focal firm, defined as a weighted moving
average

(Levinthal

&

March,

1981).

Historical

aspiration

level

is

calculated

as

At  aAt 1  (1  a) Pt 1 , where A is the aspiration level, P is the performance, t is year, and a is

the weight given to the most recent aspiration level.
- Performance relative to aspiration level: Also known as attainment discrepancy (Lant 1992),
this variable represents the gap between actual performance and expected goals. Performance
relative to aspiration level is calculated by subtracting aspiration level from actual performance
achieved. Thus, when performance exceeds aspiration level, performance relative to aspiration
level is positive. When performance is below aspiration level, performance relative to aspiration
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level is negative. Because the behavioral theory of the firm predicts different risk preferences for
firms that perform above and below aspiration level, a common way of operationalizing this
variable is to include elements of a spline function (Greve, 1998). A spline this function avoids
inappropriate “jumps” in the estimated Y values due to changes in slope. Consistent with prior
studies (e.g. Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 1998), I estimated two spline dummy variables, one
for performance above aspiration level and another for performance below aspiration level. The
former takes the value of the performance minus aspiration level if performance is greater than
or equal aspiration level and zero otherwise. The latter takes the value of the performance minus
aspiration level if performance is less than aspiration level and zero otherwise. Consequently, the
model can estimate distinct coefficients on the performance above and performance below
aspiration level.
- Organizational slack: Consistent with results from recent studies (e.g. Iyer and Miller, 2008;
Shimizu 2007), I use liquidity ratio, calculated as total assets divided by current liabilities.
Consistent with Audia and Greve (2006), I normalized slack between 0 and 1: The firm with
lowest slack has a score of 0 and the firm with highest slack has a score of 1. All other firms
have a score in between. The normalization is important because the shifting-focus model of risk
taking contends that slack affects decision makers‟ choice of the referent point and that this
choice affects risk preference: Large slack lowers the survival point, whereas small slack raises
it. Normalizing slack allows us to observe distinct effects for low and high slack. An alternative
operationalization such as a centered slack does not capture this distinction.

5.3.3. Control Variables
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In order to avoid spurious correlations, I control for several alternatives explanations for market
entry and exit at the firm- and market level.
Firm characteristics. I control for firm size, measured as the logarithm of total admitted assets. I
also control for type of firm – mutual or stock. Managers in mutual and stock firms may have
different goals – managers in stock firms seek to maximize profits, whereas managers in mutual
firms seek to minimize losses. The indicator variable is 0 for stock and 1 for mutual firms. To
account for organizational learning explanations (Amburgey & Miner 1993), I include two
variables: market experience and entry experience. The former is operationalized as the number
of markets in which the firm operates at t – 1, and the latter, as the number of entries of firm i at t
– 1.
Market characteristics. To account for population ecology explanations (Hannan & Freeman
1982), I include density and density squared in the model, measured as the number of firms
operating in the target market at t - 1. I also control for mimetic explanations of market entry
(Haveman 1993), defined as market attractiveness. This variable is measured as the number of
entries into the target market at t – 1. To control for oligopoly theory explanations (Scherer &
Ross, I used market concentration, operationalized as the Herfindahl index (Baum & Korn,
1996; Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006; Stephan et al., 2003). Market and regional differences are
controlled for in the model specification.

5.4. Data Analysis
This dissertation examines market entry and exit patterns occurring over time. The main goal
is to understand how interactions between the competition-related and firm-specific factors affect
a firm‟s likelihood of entering into or exiting from markets. Thus, my hypotheses deal with
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causal relationships as well as involve binary dependent variables. Both logistic regression and
event history modeling are estimation techniques used for this kind of empirical analysis.
However, since the characteristics of the process under study „guide‟ design decisions (Coleman
1981), it is important to understand the characteristics associated with multimarket studies and
choose the method that effectively deals with such issues.
First, this study uses a panel data sample that provides multiple observations on each firm in
the sample, incorporating cross-sectional and time-varying variables. In such an empirical setting
researchers are urged to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which occurs when some
unobserved variables correlate with the observed independent and dependent variables. Hence,
the method must provide techniques for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. Second, a
critical assumption in multimarket studies is that firms attempt to coordinate their actions across
markets. Thus, the common assumption of independence of observations is violated, since some
of a firm‟s moves may be part of a coordinated strategy. Hence, the statistical method must deal
with this issue effectively. Both logistic regression and event history methods are briefly
described and compared in turn.

5.4.1 Logistic regression modeling
Logistic regression belongs to the group of regression methods for describing the relationship
between explanatory variables and a discrete response variable. The difference between ordinary
least square (OLS) regression and logistic regression modeling lies in the fact that for linear
regression the response variable Y is continuous, which is one of the classical assumptions for
ordinary least squares to yield BLUE estimators. When this assumption is unmet, OLS poses
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serious inference problems. Consequently, when the response variable is discrete, maximum
likelihood techniques such as logistic regression are generally more efficient.
To obtain the logistic model, one must start from the linear probability model, which is a
linear sum determined by constant, unknown parameters  i , independent variables denoted as x i
and an error term:
P(of_occurring_the_event) =   X  

(Equation 5.1)

Since the linear model suffers from estimates lying outside the [0, 1] range, the linear model
must be transformed to a non-linear logistic model (equations 2 and 3):

Ln (Odds_of_occuring_the_event)  Ln

P(of_occurin g_the_event) 

P(of_occuring_the_event)
   X   (Equation 5.2)
P(not_occuring_the_event)

e    X 
1  e    X 

(Equation 5.3)

A logit model ensures that the probabilities will be within the [0, 1] range. The model also
assumes that errors follow a binomial distribution, which approximates a normal distribution for
large samples (Coleman, 1981).
There are two different ways to estimate the coefficients and control for unobserved
heterogeneity: the fixed effects approach and the random effects approach. Controlling for fixed
effects involves the estimation of intercept terms, which are operationalized as dummy variables.
This technique accounts for effects that are likely to differ between markets, firms, or firm-inmarkets, but remain constant for multiple observations (Greene 2003). The random effects
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estimation assumes that the individual-specific intercepts are random-drawings from an unknown
distribution. Hausman‟s (1978) test can help determine the most appropriate approach to model
the intercepts.
Regarding the lack of independence of observations, previous multimarket studies propose
some techniques to minimize the biasing effects. Barnett (1993) considers multimarket firms
oversampled within the dataset and proposes a technique in which observations in the dataset are
inversely weighted based on their degree of overrepresentation as a function of the multimarket
ties of a particular firm. This technique minimizes the biasing effect due to oversampling and has
been used by many multimarket studies (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan
et al. 2003).
I now describe the event history methodology, highlighting its features that set it apart from
logit and other traditional regression models.

5.4.2 Event history modeling
Event history modeling is a method for causal analysis of processes characterized in the
following way: (1) there is a collection of units (e.g. individuals, firms, societies, etc), each
moving among a finite number of states in a state space; (2) these changes (or events) may occur
at any point in time; and (3) there are time-constant and/or time-dependent factors influencing
the events (Coleman 1981, p. 6).
In other words, causal statements in event history modeling are examined by looking at
conditions that change over time. These changes are events – an event is a change in a variable –
and that happens at a specific point in time. The role of the event is to indicate that a causal
factor has changed at a specific time and that the unit under study is exposed to another causal
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condition (Blossfeld, Golsch, and Rohwer 2007). Causal statements can be summarized in the
following way:

X t   Pr( Yt ' )

t’ > t

(Equation 5.4)

This means that a change in X t will change the probability that the dependent variable
Yt , will change in the future (t’ > t). Although logistic regression models also estimate

probabilities, event history models offer an additional feature: a time-related representation for
the causal effect. This idea can be explained with equations. First, suppose that T is a random
variable that represents the duration until a change in the dependent variable occurs. Then, the
transition probability can be defined as:

Pr(t  T  t '| T  t )

t < t’

(Equation 5.5)

This is the probability that an event occurs in the time interval from t to t’. The probability
of future changes in the dependent variable per unit of time is defined as the ratio of the
transition probability to the length of the time interval:

Pr(t  T  t '| T  t )
t 't

(Equation 5.6)

Finally, the transition rate is defined as

r (t )  lim
t 't

Pr(t  T  t '| T  t )
t 't

(Equation 5.7)

where r(t) is the instantaneous rate of occurring the event. It can be interpreted as the propensity
to change the state, from origin state j to a destination state k, at time t. Again, this means that
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r(t) is a transition rate, not a transition probability, particularly because it can be greater than 1.
For instance, if r(t) is constant over time, say r(t) = 1.25, then 1.25 is the expected number of
events in a time interval that is one unit long. Alternatively, 1/r(t) gives the expected length of
time until an event occurs, in this case .80 time units. This way of defining the hazard rate also
closely corresponds to intuitive notions of risk. For example, if two persons have hazard rates of
.5 and 1.5, it is appropriate to say that the second person‟s risk of an event is three times greater
(Allison, 1982).
The transition rate is often referred to as a hazard rate. The term hazard comes from
biostatistics, where the typical event is death (Allison 1984). The term transition rate is more
often used in sociology, where many analyses have been made of transitions between discrete
states, such as marital and employment statuses (Yamaguchi 1991). In strategy, the term hazard
rate is more commonly employed than transition rate. Hence, I use the term hazard rate in this
dissertation.
The hazard rate provides the possibility of giving a time–related description of how the
process under study evolves over time. Yet it is important to realize that although the models are
called time-dependent, time itself is not a causal factor. Time dependence can be interpreted as a
proxy for time-varying causal factors that are difficult to observe (Tuma and Hannan 1984). For
instance, using event history methodology, Gimeno et al. (2005) were able to accommodate
unobservable factors beyond mimetic processes that may influence the rate of a firm‟s entry into
a host country. Time dependence might also be seen as a result of a diffusion process, in which
some sort of contagion, imitation, or simply social pressure drives the process under study
(Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995).
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Figure 5.1 illustrates different examples of how the effect of x on y develops in time. In Figure
5.1(a), the effect of x on y is time-dependent as it increases over time. Consequently, the hazard
rate is affected by both change in the covariates and the passing of time. A somewhat similar
effect is also shown in Figure 5.1(b), in which a cyclical effect pattern is described over time. In
Figure 5.1(c), the effect of x on y is time-constant, that is to say the effect of x on y does not
change with the passing of time. In this case, the transition rate is a function of the explanatory
variables only, a situation akin to traditional regression models.
Statistically, there are many possibilities for specifying the functional form of the hazard rate.
On one hand, parametric event history models assume that the shape of time dependence for the
hazard rate can be modeled as a known distribution, such as exponential, Weibull, Gompertz,
lognormal, or gamma, to name a few. For instance, in a parametric model with Gompertz
distribution – a model successfully applied in studying the lifetime of organizations (Freeman,
Carroll, and Hannan 1983) – the hazard rate is assumed to decrease monotonically with time.
The choice of one distribution over another is usually grounded on theory or previous empirical
research (Allison 1984), but researchers can also use methods for assessing which model
provides a better fit to the data, as described in Blossfeld et al. (2007).
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Figure 5.1 – Temporal shapes of how a change in x effects a change in y

On the other hand, semi-parametric event history models represent a more flexible way to
handle time dependence, since these models assume time dependence without specifying its form
(Yamaguchi 1991). The most widely applied semi-parametric model is the proportional hazards
model, which is based on an estimation approach proposed by Cox (1972). The proportional
hazards model assumes that hazard rates are a log linear function of parameters for the effects of
covariates (Yamaguchi 1991). For example, the hazard rate of entry by firm i in market m at time
t may be written as

him (t )  h0 (t )  exp( X im (t ))

(Equation 5.8)
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where the hazard rate, is the product of an unspecified baseline rate, h0 (t ) , and a vector of
independent and control variables, X.
Researchers can also estimate stratified event-history models (Blossfeld et al., 2007). In a
stratified model the baseline rate h0 (t ) can be different for each category of a specific
explanatory variable. In other words, the baseline hazards are allowed to differ by group,
although the coefficients are constrained to be the same. For example, in a sample of
multinational firms, competitive conditions may vary depending on the host country in which
firms operate. Hence, rather than assuming that all firms face the same baseline hazard, a
stratified model for this sample would include unique country-specific baseline hazard rates to
account for host country differences.

5.5 Model Specification and Estimation
Consistent with prior studies in multimarket competition and behavioral theory (e.g. Barnett
1993; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Iyer and Miller, 2008), I opted to use event history
modeling. The distributions for time to an event like market entry or exit might be dissimilar
from normal, as they are almost certaintly nonsymmetic. Thus, the problem of logistic linear
regression to analyze survival data is with the assumed normality of the residuals. Moreover, in
analyzing entry, censoring may occur when a firm no longer operates in a given market or when
entry has not occurred until the end of the study. Event history models effectively deal with
nonnormality and censoring issues.
This methodology also permits that the observations for the same entity to be divided into
groups of independent observations to account for the correlation between observations
belonging to the same firm. This aspect is important in this dissertation, as a focal firm can enter
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several markets in a given year and such decisions are not independent. Furthermore, eventhistory stratified models permit the estimation of a distinct baseline rate for each market, so that
any idiosyncrasies of the market (e.g. stringent state market in terms of state regulations) can be
controlled for.
In this dissertation I estimate a stratified proportional hazards model. As above mentioned,
proportional hazards models represent a flexible way to handle time dependence, provided that
the sample satisfies the proportionality assumption. I test this assumption and present the results
in Chapter 6.
My theoretical model presents empirical challenges as it integrates behavioral antecedents
into multimarket competition. To translate this theoretical integration into a testable model, I
combine empirical methods from prior research in both multimarket competition and the
behavioral theory of the firm.
The specification of my empirical model follows the theory. First, I create a baseline model
with firm- and market-level control variables. Next, because my hypotheses build on the
arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm and the shifting-focus model of risk taking, I
test whether the behavioral predictions are supported. I start including the dummy variables for
performance PerfBelowA sp t 1 and PerfAboveA sp t 1 , which represent the behavioral variables
from the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). Consistent with Audia and Greve
(2006), I then include the normalized measure of slack and its interaction terms with
performance

above

and below aspiration

level:

Slackt 1 ,

PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 ,

and PerfAboveA sp t 1  Slackt 1 . By including all these variables in the model, I am able to
estimate effects of four conditions: (1) performance below aspiration level and low slack, (2)
performance above aspiration level and low slack, (3) performance below aspiration level and
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high slack, and (4) performance above aspiration level and high slack. Because the effect for the
lowest-slack firm in the data is the main effect of firm performance, and the effect for the
highest-slack firm in the data is the sum of the main effect of firm performance and slack, I
interpret the effect of each condition as follows:
-

Condition 1: coefficient on PerfBelowA sp t 1

-

Condition 2: coefficient on PerfAboveA sp t 1

-

Condition 3: sum of coefficients ( PerfBelowA sp t 1 + PerfBelowA sp t 1  Slackt 1 )

-

Condition 4: sum of coefficients ( PerfAboveA sp t 1 + PerfAboveA sp t 1  Slackt 1 )

In testing March and Shapira‟s model, risk aversion for performance below aspiration level
and low slack indicates a positive coefficient on PerfBelowA sp t 1 and risk seeking for
performance below aspiration level and high slack indicates a negative sum of the coefficients
( PerfBelowA sp t 1 + PerfBelowA sp t 1  Slackt 1 ). Risk aversion for firms performing above
aspiration level regardless of their level of slack indicates positive coefficients on both
PerfAboveA spt 1 and PerfAboveA spt 1  Slackt 1 .

Next, I include the linear and quadratic terms for multimarket contact MMC t 1 MMC t21 in the
equation, representing the competitive antecedents of market entry.
Thus far, I have included sets of variables for behavioral and competitive antecedents. To
integrate the behavioral logic into the mutual forbearance logic, I created the following two- and
three-way

interactions2:

MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1 ,

MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1 ,

MMCt 1  Slackt 1 , MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 , MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1  Slackt 1 .

2

To remove nonessential multicolinearity, I centered the predictors before running the analysis.
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The effects of the four behavioral conditions on the mutual forbearance logic are captured as
follows:
-

Condition 1: coefficient on MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1

-

Condition 2: coefficient on MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1

-

Condition 3: sum of coefficients
( MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1 + MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 )

-

Condition 4: sum of coefficients
( MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1 + MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1  Slackt 1 )

All the interactions with MMC t 1 account for changes in both the threshold at which the
forbearance effect starts to operate (the inflection point) and the magnitude of the inverted-U
curve (the amplifying and attenuating effects).
As mentioned in Section 5.3, my measures of market entry and exit are discrete (0 or 1) and
my explanatory variables are a mix of continuous and discrete variables. Accordingly, I estimate
a discrete-time stratified proportional hazards model3. The full equation for market entry is
defined as follows:
him (t )  h0 m (t ) exp[1 PerfAboveAsp t 1   2 PerfBelowAsp t 1 

 3 ( PerfAboveAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   4 ( PerfBelowAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   5 Slackt 1 

(Equation 5.9)

 6 MMCt 1   7 MMC 
 8 ( MMCt 1  PerfAboveAsp t 1 )   9 ( MMCt 1  PerfBelowAsp t 1 )  10 ( MMCt 1  Slackt 1 ) 
2
t 1

11 ( MMCt 1  PerfAboveAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )  12 ( MMCt 1  PerfBelowAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   ' Ct 1 ]
where him (t ) is the instantaneous hazard rate of firm i's entry into market m in t, h0 m (t ) is the
baseline hazard rate for market m, and C t 1 is the vector of control variables.

3

All of the empirical tests are run on the statistical computing package Stata
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The implications of my hypotheses for the entry model coefficients are straightforward. The
inverted-U curvilinear relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates as
predicted in the null hypothesis 0a indicates a positive coefficient on MMCt 1 and a negative
coefficient on MMCt21 . The moderating effect as predicted in Hypothesis 1a indicates a positive
sum of the coefficients on MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 and MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 ,
meaning that the effect of MMCt 1 on market entry rates is amplified under conditions of
performance below aspiration level and high slack.

Furthermore, the moderating effect as

predicted in Hypothesis 2a indicates a negative coefficient on MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 ,
meaning that the effect of MMCt 1 on market entry rates is attenuated under conditions of
performance below aspiration level and low slack. Finally, the lack of a moderating effect for
performance above aspiration level as predicted in Hypothesis 3a indicates non-significant
coefficients on both MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1 and MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1  Slackt 1 .
The full equation for market exit is defined as follows:
him (t )  h0 m (t ) exp[ 1 PerfAboveAsp t 1   2 PerfBelowAsp t 1 

(Equation 5.10)
 3 ( PerfAboveAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   4 ( PerfBelowAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   5 Slackt 1 
 6 MMCt 1 
 7 ( MMCt 1  PerfAboveAsp t 1 )   8 ( MMCt 1  PerfBelowAsp t 1 )   9 ( MMCt 1  Slackt 1 ) 

 10 ( MMCt 1  PerfAboveAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   11 ( MMCt 1  PerfBelowAsp t 1  Slackt 1 )   ' C t 1 ]
where him (t ) is the instantaneous hazard rate of firm i's exit from market m in t, h0 m (t ) the
baseline hazard rate for market m, and C t 1 is the vector of control variables.
The implications of my hypotheses for the exit model coefficients are also straightforward.
The negative relationship between multimarket contact and market exit rates predicted in the null
hypothesis 0b indicates a negative coefficient for MMCt 1 .
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The moderating effect as predicted in Hypothesis 1b indicates a positive sum of the
coefficients on MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 and MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 , meaning
that the effect of MMCt 1 on market exit rates is attenuated under conditions of performance
below aspiration level and high slack.

Furthermore, the moderating effect as predicted in

Hypothesis 2b indicate a negative estimated coefficient on MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 , meaning
that the effect of MMCt 1 on market exit rates is amplified under conditions of performance
below aspiration level and low slack. Finally, the lack of moderating effects for performance
above aspiration level as predicted in Hypothesis 3b indicates non-significant coefficients on
MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1 and MMC t 1  PerfAboveA spt 1  Slackt 1 .
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CHAPTER 6 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter tests the hypotheses of the proposed research model of this dissertation and
includes the following sections: (1) results and (2) discussion of findings.

6.1 Results
Given that this study examines two distinct scope decisions, the results section is organized
into two sub-sections, market entry and exit.
6.1.1 Market Entry
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and correlations are presented in Table 6.1. A look at the
correlation matrix shows us no significantly high correlations between variables that could bias
the estimates. Most importantly, the magnitude of correlations between the explanatory variables
– MMC, slack, and performance above and below aspiration level – was low, indicating that
multicollinearity was not a concern.
Some correlations between control variables are noteworthy. Firms with experience in several
markets seem to have greater entry experience (r = .22). Large firms tend to have experience in
several markets (r = .53), but seem to avoid crowded markets (r = .14). Moreover, crowded
markets seem to be attractive (r = .21) and not concentrated (r = -.44).

-----------------------------Table 6.1 about here
------------------------------

As mentioned in section 5.5, I use a discrete-time stratified proportional hazards model in my
analysis. Because this model assumes proportionality, I must test whether this assumption is
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satisfied. I run two tests, one based on reestimation (linktest function in Stata) and the other
based on Schoenfeld (1982) residuals (estat phtest function in Stata). The former tests whether
the model is correctly specified and the latter tests whether the log hazard-ratio is constant over
time. There was no evidence that the proportional hazards assumption was violated.
Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 present the event-history analysis estimates of market entry at time t as
a function on the firm‟s behavioral and competitive antecedents at time t – 1. Each table shows
the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and tests for significance of each variable. For each
model, the log likelihood statistic is given along with other statistics that indicate model fit. I also
assess the multiplier effect of each statistically significant variable. The multipliers are calculated
as exp(  x ) and describe the risk of experiencing market entry relative to the baseline hazard.
Model 1 shows the baseline model, which contains the variables controlling for alternative
market entry explanations. Firms are more likely to enter concentrated and crowded markets. A
1-unit increase in market concentration increased the rate of entry by 91 percent and an
additional firm operating in the target market increased the rate of entry by 23 percent Moreover,
firms with experience in several markets and firms that have engaged in market entry activity in
the previous year are more likely to expand into new markets in the next year. Indeed, as the
number of markets in which the firm operated or the number of entries in the previous year
increases by 1, the rate of entry increased by 3 percent. Mutual firms are less likely to enter new
markets. In fact, being a mutual firm reduced entry rates by over half (100% - 48%) from what
the rates for stock firms are. Firm size and market attractiveness had no significant effect on
market entry rates.
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Table 6.2 – Behavioral Antecedents of Market Entry
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. Level
Performance below asp. Level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * Slack
Performance below asp. level * Slack

0.65
0.21
0.00
0.01
-0.12
-0.72
0.03
0.03

Model 1
***
(0.08)
***
(0.02)
***
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
**
(0.27)
***
(0.01)
***
(0.01)

Observations
55,963
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
342.74 (8)
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-7,392.43
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

0.65
0.21
0.00
0.02
-0.12
-0.67
0.03
0.03
0.10
-1.15

Model 2
*** (0.08)
*** (0.02)
*** (0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
*
(0.27)
*** (0.01)
*** (0.01)
(0.53)
(0.74)

55,963
451.44 (10)
0.00
-7,364.63
55.60 ***

0.64
0.20
0.00
0.02
-0.12
-0.58
0.03
0.03
-6.74
3.90
-1.47
15.28
-13.79

Model 3
***
(0.08)
***
(0.02)
***
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.11)
*
(0.26)
***
(0.01)
***
(0.01)
**
(2.21)
*
(1.73)
(1.11)
**
(4.46)
***
(3.25)

55,963
483.76 (13)
0.00
-7,256.31
272.25 ***

As mentioned in section 5.5, before testing the hypotheses of the study, I must test whether
the shifting-focus model‟s predictions are supported. Model 2 adds the behavioral theory of the
firm antecedents to the baseline model and shows that performance above and below aspiration
level has a nonsignificant effect on market entry rates. Model 3 adds the interactions with slack.
Because slack is normalized, the main effect now equals the effect on low slack firms and the
main effect plus the interaction equals the effect on high slack firms. The significant estimates in
Model 3 show that the nonsignificant effects in Model 2 were due to a blending of two opposite
effects for firms with different levels of slack. Thus, the interactions with slack disentangled the
effects of performance on low and high slack firms, which is consistent with Audia and Greve‟s
(2006) findings. The main effect of performance below aspiration level has a positive effect on
market entry rates, which indicates risk aversion in low-slack firms. The sum of the main effect
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and the interaction of performance below aspiration level and slack has a significant negative
effect on market entry rates (3.90-13.79=-9.89, p < 0), which indicates risk seeking in high-slack
firms. In this and all subsequent models that include interactions of slack and performance below
aspiration level, the sum of the coefficients is negative, consistent with risk seeking in high slack
firms. To clarify this interaction, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance below aspiration
level on market entry rates over the observed range of performance below aspiration level at low
and high levels of slack.
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0.5

Multiplier of the Entry Rate
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0
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Figure 6.1 – Interactive effects of slack and performance below aspiration level on market
entry rates

The graph shows that when performance below aspiration level decreased by one standard
deviation, market entry rates decreased by 41 percent for low-slack firms and increased by 31
percent for high-slack firms. Thus, low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk
seekers with distance below aspiration level, which is consistent with March and Shapira‟s
model.
Regarding performance above aspiration level, the main effect has a negative and significant
effect on market entry rates, which indicates risk aversion in low-slack firms. The sum of the
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main effect and the interaction of performance above aspiration level and slack has a positive
effect on market entry rates (-6.74+15.28 = 8.54, p < 0), which indicates risk seeking in highslack firms. In this and all subsequent models with interactions of slack and performance above
aspiration level, the sum of the coefficients is positive, consistent with risk seeking in high slack
firms. To clarify this interaction, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance above aspiration
level on market entry rates over the observed range of performance above aspiration level at low
and high levels of slack.
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Figure 6.2 – Interactive effects of slack and performance above aspiration level on market entry
rates

The graph shows that when performance above aspiration level increased by one standard
deviation, market entry rates decreased by 82 percent for low-slack firms and increased by 25
percent for high-slack firms. Thus, low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk
seekers with distance above aspiration level. These results are not consistent with Audia and
Greve (2006), as they found that large firms, irrespective of performance, are risk averse.
However, these results are consistent with Baum et al. (2005) findings that performance far
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above aspiration levels has a similar effect on risk taking as performance far below them.
Furthermore, these findings resonates March and Shapira‟s (1992) contention that low slack
firms do reduce risk.
Table 6.3 presents main effects of behavioral and competitive antecedents on market entry
rates. Before testing the moderating hypotheses of the study, I must test whether the mutual
forbearance hypothesis (H0a) is supported. Model 4 adds the linear and quadratic terms of
multimarket contact to the baseline model and shows an inverted-U-shaped effect of multimarket
contact. Thus, H0a is supported.

Table 6.3 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Entry (Main Effects)
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. Level
Performance below asp. Level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * Slack
Performance below asp. level * Slack
MMC
MMC squared

Model 4
0.63 ***
0.21 ***
0.00 ***
0.01
-0.11
-0.82 **
0.03 ***
0.03 ***

5.63 ***
-11.16 *

Observations
55,963
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
351.18 (10)
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-7,225.96
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
332.95 ***
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.12)
(0.24)
(0.01)
(0.01)

(1.38)
(5.20)

Model 5
0.63 ***
0.20 ***
0.00 ***
0.01
-0.11
-0.77 **
0.03 ***
0.03 ***
-0.01
-1.01

5.64 ***
-10.27 *
55,963
413.38 (12)
0.00
-7,203.83
377.20 ***

(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.12)
(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.54)
(0.73)

(1.36)
(5.80)

Model 6
0.62 ***
0.20 ***
0.00 ***
0.02
-0.11
-0.69 **
0.03 ***
0.03 ***
-7.03 **
3.76 *
-1.31
15.72 **
-13.03 ***
5.74 ***
-9.72 *

(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.12)
(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(2.29)
(1.72)
(1.15)
(4.57)
(3.24)
(1.43)
(4.90)

55,963
450.58 (15)
0.00
-7,097.65
589.57 ***
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Figure 6.3 presents the effect graphically. The inflection point of this curve occurs at a value
of .24 for multimarket contact4, and lies within the observed range for multimarket contact (0 to
1). Thus, as multimarket contact increases from 0 to .24, the rate of market entry also increases,
reaching a multiplier effect of 1.98, which indicates that the level of multimarket contact at the
threshold nearly doubled market entry rates. Above the threshold, the rate of entry starts to
decrease, reaching a multiplier close to zero, which indicates that the rate of entry at the highest
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level of multimarket contact is decreased by almost 100%.
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Figure 6.3 – Relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates

Model 5 adds performance above and below aspiration level and shows a negative but
insignificant effect. However, the linear and quadratic terms for MMC remained significant.
Model 6 adds the interactions of slack and performance relative to aspiration level and shows
that the estimates became significant. The effect of performance below aspiration level on entry
rates is positive for low-slack firms and negative for high-slack firms. Similar to the pattern of

4

The threshold is calculated as the point where the first partial derivative of equation 5.9 with respect to
multimarket contact is equal to zero.
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nonsignificant effects found in model 2, the lack of significance in model 5 was due to a
blending of two opposite effects for firms with different levels of slack. The log-likelihood for
Model 6 was -7,097.65, which indicates a significant improvement in fit to data over either
Model 3 (behavioral antecedents only, -7,256.31) or Model 4 (competitive antecedents only, 7,225.96). Moreover, the estimates for the coefficients were significant and consistent with both
the shifting-focus model and mutual forbearance predictions. This pattern of results suggests that
behavioral and competitive antecedents together explain market entry behavior better than each
set of antecedents individually.
Models 7 and 8 in Table 6.4 present results for the interactive effects of behavioral and
competitive antecedents, and enables me to test Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a. Model 7 adds the
interactions of MMC with performance above and below aspiration level. The coefficients on
both interactions are nonsignificant and the linear and quadratic terms for MMC became
nonsignificant. However, the coefficients on the interactions of slack and performance below and
above aspiration level remained significant.
Model 8 adds the three-way interactions of MMC with slack and performance above and
below aspiration level. The coefficients on the interaction of MMC and performance below
aspiration level now became significant. Similar to the patterns of results in Models 2 and 5,
these results again suggest the nonsignificant effects in Model 7 were due to a blending of two
opposite effects for firms with different levels of slack.
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Table 6.4 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Entry (Interactive Effects)
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. Level
Performance below asp. Level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * Slack
Performance below asp. level * Slack
MMC
MMC squared
MMC * Performance above asp. Level
MMC * Performance below asp. level
MMC * Slack
MMC * Performance above asp. Level * Slack
MMC * Performance below asp. level * Slack

Model 7
0.62 ***
0.20 ***
0.00 ***
0.02
-0.11
-0.70 **
0.03 ***
0.03 ***
-7.16 **
3.77 *
-1.40
15.99 ***
-13.10 ***
3.76
-9.88
-4.52
3.64

Observations
55,963
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
470.98 (18)
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-7,092.81
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
599.24 ***
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(2.21)
(1.79)
(1.13)
(4.44)
(3.47)
(2.94)
(6.96)
(5.58)
(5.10)

Model 8
0.62 ***
0.20 ***
0.00 ***
0.02
-0.11
-0.70 **
0.03 ***
0.03 ***
-7.34 **
4.17 *
-1.52
16.37 ***
-14.00 ***
0.74
-10.13
-4.94
-22.30 **
12.43 †
-1.83
58.55 **

(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.12)
(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(2.18)
(1.74)
(1.12)
(4.38)
(2.93)
(3.67)
(6.90)
(18.94)
(8.52)
(7.91)
(35.14)
(19.78)

55,963
598.06 (20)
0.00
-7,080.34
624.19 ***

Recall that the amplifying effect as predicted in hypothesis 1a requires a positive sum of the
coefficients on the two-way and on the three-way interactions, that is to say,
( MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 ) + ( MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 ) > 0. The sum of the
coefficients is positive and significant (58.55 + (-22.30) = 36.25, p < 0). Therefore, H1a is
supported.
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To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market entry rates over
the observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three increasing levels of slack (μ,
μ+1σ, μ+2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. Figures 6.4
and 6.5 show these effects. When slack equals .45 (μ), the maximum multiplier is 1.42 at a value
of .30 for MMC; when slack equals .57 (μ + σ), the maximum multiplier is 1.88 at a value of .35
for MMC, and when slack equals .69 (μ + 2σ), the maximum multiplier is 2.66 at a value of .40
for MMC. Therefore, for abundant-slack firms, performance below aspiration level both
amplified the effect of MMC on market entry rates and pushed the threshold away from the point
where it would be under normal conditions.
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Figure 6.4 – Amplifying effect of below-aspiration performance on market entry rates of
high-slack firms
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Figure 6.5 – Three-dimensional views of the amplifying effect on market entry rates

Regarding hypothesis 2a, recall that the predicted attenuating effect requires a negative
coefficient on the two-way interaction MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 . The negative and significant
coefficient indicates risk aversion. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported.
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market entry rates over
the observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three decreasing levels of slack (μ, μ1σ, μ-2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. Figures 6.6
and 6.7 show these effects. When slack equals .45 (μ), the maximum multiplier is 1.42 at a value
of .30 for MMC; when slack equals .33 (μ - σ), the maximum multiplier is 1.14 at a value of .25
for MMC, and when slack equals .21 (μ - 2σ), the maximum multiplier is 0.98 at a value of .20
for MMC. Therefore, for limited-slack firms, performance below aspiration level both attenuated
the effect of MMC on market entry rates and moved the threshold to the left from the point
where it should be under normal conditions.
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Figure 6.6 – Attenuating effect of below-aspiration performance on market entry rates lowslack firms
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Finally, Hypothesis 3a predicts that firms performing above aspiration level do not have
incentives to disrupt the multimarket structures, meaning that performance above aspiration level
does not moderate the relationship between MMC and market entry. Both the coefficient on the
two-way interaction of MMC and performance above aspiration level and the coefficient on the
three-way interaction of MMC, performance above aspiration level and slack are not significant.
Thus, hypothesis 3a is supported.

6.1.2 Market Exit
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and correlations are presented in Table 6.5. A look at the
correlation matrix shows us no significantly high correlations between variables that could bias
the estimates. Similar to the results for market entry, the magnitude of correlations between the
explanatory variables – MMC, slack, and performance above and below aspiration level – was
low, indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern.
-----------------------------Table 6.5 about here
------------------------------

Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 present the event-history analysis estimates of market exit at time t as
a function on the firm‟s behavioral and competitive antecedents at time t – 1. Each table shows
the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and tests for significance of each variable. For each
model, the log likelihood statistic is given along with other statistics that indicate model fit. I also
assess the multiplier effect of each statistically significant variable. The multipliers are calculated
as exp(  x ) and describe the risk of experiencing market exit relative to the baseline hazard.
Model 1 shows the baseline model. Firms are more likely to exit from concentrated and
crowded markets. An increment of one standard deviation in market concentration increased exit
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rates by 3 percent. Moreover, unlike the results for market entry, firms are more likely to exit
from attractive markets. An increment of one standard deviation in market attractiveness
increased exit rates by 12 percent. Firms with experience in several markets and mutual firms are
less likely to exit from markets. In fact, mutual firms have exit rates that are half of the rates for
stock firms. Entry experience and firm size had no significant effect on exit rates.
Table 6.6 – Behavioral Antecedents of Market Exit
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. level
Performance below asp. level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * slack
Performance below asp. level * slack

Model 1
0.61 ***
0.78 ***
0.00
0.07 †
0.06
-1.64 **
-0.01 *
-0.01

Observations
40,224
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
504.64
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-12,294.61
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.67)
(0.01)
(0.02)

Model 2
0.61 ***
0.78 ***
0.00
0.08 *
0.05
-1.57 **
-0.01 **
-0.01
1.28 **
-1.47 ***

40,224
510.67
0.00
-12,191.46
206.29 ***

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.67)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.76)
(0.41)

Model 3
0.61 ***
0.76 ***
0.00
0.08 †
-0.01
-1.14 †
-0.01 **
-0.01
0.25
0.95
-6.76 **
4.95
-15.14 **

40,224
538.59
0.00
-11,838.28
912.66 ***

First, I test whether the March-Shapira‟s model is supported. Model 2 first adds performance
below and above aspiration level to the baseline model. Unlike the results for market entry,
performance above and below aspiration level have significant effects on market exit rates. To
clarify these effects, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance above and below aspiration
level on market exit rates over the observed range of performance. I followed Greve‟s (2003)
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(0.07)
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(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.64)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(1.35)
(0.77)
(2.45)
(9.39)
(6.83)

lead in constructing the figure. First, I set the multiplier at 1 at the origin and then varied
performance below and above aspiration levels 2.5 standard deviations from the origin and
computed new predicted values using the coefficient estimates of Model 2.
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Figure 6.8 – Multiplier effect of distance from aspiration level on market exit rates

As Figure 6.8 shows, the rate of exit decreases as performance increases below aspiration
level, but changes its direction at aspiration level, increasing as performance increases above
aspiration level. Thus, the behavioral logic that predicts different behaviors for performance
above and below aspiration level is supported.
Model 3 adds the interactions of performance relative to aspiration level and slack. Because
slack is normalized, the main effect equals the effect on low slack firms and the main effect plus
the interaction equals the effect on high slack firms. Unlike the results for market entry, only the
coefficients on slack and on the interaction of slack and performance below aspiration level are
statistically significant. Thus, March-Shapira‟s shifting-focus model is partially supported for
market exit behavior.
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Table 6.7 presents main effects of behavioral and competitive antecedents on market exit
rates. Before testing the moderating hypotheses, I must test the mutual forbearance null
hypothesis (H0b). Model 4 adds the linear term of multimarket contact to the baseline model and
shows a negative effect of multimarket contact on market exit rates. Thus, hypothesis H0b is
supported. At the average value for multimarket contact (µ = .78), the multiplier of exit rate is
.33, which indicates the typical level of multimarket contact lowers exit rates by 67 percent.

Table 6.7 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Exit (Main Effects)
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. Level
Performance below asp. Level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * slack
Performance below asp. level * slack
MMC

Model 4
0.62 ***
0.78 ***
0.00
0.07 †
0.06
-1.62 **
-0.01 **
-0.01

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.67)
(0.01)
(0.02)

-1.41

(0.79)

*

Observations
40,224
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
498.52
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-12,280.69
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
27.85 ***
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

Model 5
0.62 ***
0.78 ***
0.00
0.08 *
0.05
-1.54 *
-0.01 *
-0.01
1.28 *
-1.47 ***

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.67)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.76)
(0.41)

-1.50

(0.86)

40,224
503.75
0.00
-12,176.61
235.99

*

***

Model 6
0.62 ***
0.77 ***
0.00
0.08 †
-0.01
-1.11 †
-0.01 **
-0.01
0.14
0.99
-6.85 **
5.64
-15.46 **
-1.64 *
40,224
530.83
0.00
-11,821.19
946.83

***

Figure 6.9 presents this effect graphically. As multimarket contact increased from 0 to 1, the
rate of market exit decreased, reaching a multiplier effect of .24, which indicates that the rate of
exit at the highest level of multimarket contact is decreased by 76 percent.
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Figure 6.9 – Relationship between multimarket contact and market exit rates

Model 5 adds performance and shows a significant effect on exit rates above and below
aspiration level. Performance below aspiration level has a negative estimate and performance
above aspiration level has a positive estimate, a pattern similar to Model 2. Model 6 adds the
interactions of slack and performance relative to aspiration level and yields coefficients similar
to the ones in Model 3.
Models 7 and 8 in Table 6.8 present results for the interactive effects of behavioral and
competitive antecedents. Model 7 adds the interactions of MMC with performance above and
below aspiration level. The coefficients on both interactions are nonsignificant. Model 8 adds the
three-way interactions of MMC with slack and performance above and below aspiration level,
and enables me to test Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b.
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Table 6.8 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Exit (Interactive Effects)
Variables
Market concentration
Market density
Market density squared
Market attractiveness
Firm size
Mutual
Firm's market experience
Firm's entry experience
Performance above asp. Level
Performance below asp. Level
Slack
Performance above asp. level * slack
Performance below asp. level * slack
MMC
MMC * Performance above asp. Level
MMC * Performance below asp. Level
MMC * Slack
MMC * Performance above asp. level * slack
MMC * Performance below asp. level * slack

Model 7
0.62 ***
0.76 ***
0.00
0.08 *
-0.01
-1.10 †
-0.01 **
-0.01
-0.44
1.04
-6.96 **
7.75
-15.68 **
-1.41 †
-5.16
0.43

Observations
40,224
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)
567.91
Probability > chi-square
0.00
Log-likelihood
-11,816.66
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square
955.91
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1

***

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.64)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(1.55)
(0.79)
(2.47)
(9.51)
(7.00)
(0.91)
(4.76)
(2.72)

Model 8
0.62 ***
0.77 ***
0.00
0.08 *
-0.02
-1.12 †
-0.01 **
-0.01
-0.15
1.01
-6.87 **
6.64
-15.63 **
-3.48 *
2.55
-3.34 *
10.30 †
-50.15
25.67 *
40,224
566.72
0.00
-11,810.13
968.96

(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.65)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(1.58)
(0.77)
(2.43)
(9.59)
(6.97)
(1.90)
(7.46)
(1.15)
(6.72)
(36.94)
(14.37)

***

Recall that the attenuating effect as predicted in hypothesis 1b requires a positive sum of the
coefficients on the two-way and on the three-way interactions, that is to say,
( MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 ) + ( MMC t 1  PerfBelowA spt 1  Slackt 1 ) > 0. The sum of the
coefficients is positive and significant (25.67 + (-3.34) = 22.33, p < 0), indicating risk seeking.
Therefore, H1b is supported.
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market exit rates over the
observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three increasing levels of slack (μ, μ+1σ,
μ+2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. As shown in
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Figures 6.10 and 6.11, increasing levels of slack retard the effect of multimarket contact on
market exit rates.
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Figure 6.10 – Attenuating effect of below-aspiration performance on market exit rates of high-slack
firms
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Figure 6.11 – Three-dimensional views of the attenuating effect on market exit rates
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Regarding hypothesis 2b, recall that the predicted amplifying effect requires a negative
coefficient on the two-way interaction MMC t 1  PerfBelowA sp t 1 . The negative and significant
coefficient indicates risk aversion. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported.
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market exit rates over the
observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three decreasing levels of slack (μ, μ-1σ,
μ-2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. As shown in
Figures 6.12 and 6.13, decreasing levels of slack accelerates the effect of multimarket contact on
market exit rates.
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Figure 6.12 – Amplifying effect of below-aspiration performance on market exit rates of
low-slack firms
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Figure 6.713 – Three-dimensional views of the amplifying effect on market exit rates

Finally, Hypothesis 3b predicts that firms performing above aspiration level do not have
incentives to disrupt the multimarket structures, meaning that performance above aspiration level
does not moderate the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. Both the
coefficient on the two-way and three-way interactions of MMC, performance above aspiration
level and slack are not significant. Thus, hypothesis 3b is supported.

6.2 Discussion
Due to the nature of the hypothesized effects of the competitive and behavioral antecedents
on corporate strategic decisions, I tested direct and moderating effects of the respective variables.
Table 6.9 summarizes the findings, which are discussed in turn.

118

Table 7.1 – Summary of Empirical Results
Moderators
Baseline model (mutual forbearance
hypothesis)
Performance below aspiration level and
high slack
Performance below aspiration level and
low slack
Performance above aspiration level,
irrespective of the level of slack resources

Market Entry
inverted-U-shaped relationship
H0a supported
amplifying effect
H1a supported
attenuating effect
H2a supported
no effect
H3a supported

Market Exit
negative relationship
H0b supported
attenuating effect
H1b supported
amplifying effect
H2b supported
no effect
H3b supported

6.2.1 Competitive antecedents of market entry and exit
The results provide strong support for the mutual forbearance null hypotheses with respect
to market entry and exit. Consistent with findings in prior research on market entry (Haveman &
Nonnemaker, 2000; Baum & Korn, 1999; Stephan et al., 2003, Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006),
insurance firms do take into account the level of multimarket contact as they enter into new
markets. Between low to moderate levels of multimarket contact, firms have an incentive to
build deterrence capability. The results show that entry rates first increases, up to a threshold of
multimarket contact that nearly doubles entry rates. Beyond the threshold, firms recognize their
extended interdependence with rivals and refrain from entering into markets with high
multimarket contact, which explains multipliers close to zero at very high levels of multimarket
contact.
The results for market exit complement this rationale, in that once firms establish mutual
footholds with rivals, they are unlikely to abandon them. Consistent with previous studies in
market exit (Barnett, 1993, Baum & Korn, 1996; Boeker et al. 1997), the results show strong
support for the negative relationship between multimarket contact and exit rates. Thus, insurance
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firms are more likely to exit from markets with low levels of multimarket contact than those with
high levels of multimarket contact.
It is worthwhile to discuss an exception in the market exit literature. Barn and Korn (1999)
is the only study that predicted an inverted-U-shaped relationship between multimarket contact
and exit rates, meaning that both entry and exit follow similar patterns. In order to explain the
rise in exit rates between low and moderate levels of multimarket contact, they introduced the
idea of exit as an outcome of competitive interaction or, in other words, exit as a forced strategy.
For the decline in exit rates beyond the threshold, they consider exit as a strategic move,
applying the mutual forbearance argument. Thus, they conceptualize exit differently according to
the level of multimarket contact. Because I defined market exit as a decision rather than an
outcome and applied this definition across the entire range of multimarket contact, my theoretical
model builds on prior research and only considers the negative relationship between multimarket
contact and exit rates.
Nevertheless, I investigated the possibility of an inverted-U curve for market exit in this
sample. My motivation was the fact that Baum and Korn (1999) reported contradictory findings
between that study and their previous work. Baum and Korn (1996) found a negative coefficient
on the linear term for multimarket contact, but, when they later added the quadratic term (Baum
& Korn, 1999), the coefficient on the linear term became positive, and the coefficient on the
quadratic term was negative, which indicates an inverted-U-shaped relationship between
multimarket contact and exit rates. To rule out this possibility, I estimated an additional model,
not shown in Table 6.7, in which I included a quadratic term for multimarket contact. The
coefficient on the linear term was -3.61, which indicates that the coefficient remained negative,
the coefficient on the quadratic term was -16.34, and both were significant at p < .01. This
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pattern of results shows an accelerating decline in exit rates, which suggests that insurance firms
are eager to keep the mutual footholds as the level of multimarket contact further increases.
Thus, I did not find evidence of an inverted-U-curve for market exit decisions in the insurance
industry.
The nature of the industry and the period of observation can possibly explain these different
results. Baum and Korn (1999) found the inverted-U-shaped curve for market exit in the airline
industry in a period of observation following intense deregulation, whereas I tested my
hypotheses in a mature, well established industry. This suggests that competitive dynamics
seems to vary across different industries and time periods. Another plausible explanation is the
fact that I examined geo-product markets. This departure from a traditional focus on geographic
markets presents a more complete picture of the competitive environment that managers take
into account when restructuring their firm‟s business scope.

6.2.2 Behavioral antecedents of market entry and exit
Because the theoretical model predicted moderating effects of behavioral antecedents on the
mutual forbearance logic, it was important to examine the direct effect of these variables. I tested
two behavioral models. First, I tested the original variables according to the behavioral theory of
the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and the prospect theory traditions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979):
performance above and below aspiration level. Second, because the predictions for performance
below aspiration level are still controversial, I tested an outgrowth of the behavioral theory of the
firm – the shifting focus model of risk taking (March & Shapira 1992). This model takes into
account the moderating effect of organizational context on the reaction to performance feedback.
I compared the results from these two models for market entry and exit.
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Regarding market entry, I found that the shifting focus model offers a better explanation for
market entry activity. The original behavioral variables (performance below and above aspiration
level) became significant only when the organizational context (slack) is taken into account. For
performance below aspiration level, the results are consistent with previous studies that tested
March-Shapira model (Miller & Chen, 2004; Audia & Greve, 2006). Because the opportunities
to recover from shortfall are more salient than the dangers associated with risk taking for highslack firms, these firms expand their business scope with distance below aspiration level.
Conversely, for low-slack firms, the dangers associated with risk taking become more salient
than its opportunities, preventing managers from pursuing risk. Thus, low-slack firms contract
their business scope with distance below aspiration level.
Interestingly, my findings disagree with Audia and Greve (2006) for performance above
aspiration level. Whereas they found that the effect of performance above aspiration level is not
significant, I found that low- and high slack firms performing above aspiration level have
different risk preferences: Low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk seeking
as performance above aspiration level increases. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with
Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang (2005) findings that performance far above aspiration
levels has a similar effect on risk taking as performance far below them. Similarly, Iyer and
Miller (2008) found risk seeking for performance above aspiration level in a study of acquisition
behavior in manufacturing industries.
In terms of exit behavior, the behavioral theory of the firm and prospect theory prediction for
performance below aspiration level is supported. Exit rates increase with distance below
aspiration level, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Shimizu, 2007). Interestingly, my
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findings provide rare evidence of exit behavior when performance is above aspiration level. In
such condition, exit rates increases with distance above aspiration level.

6.2.3 To forbear or not to forbear?
The theoretical model of this study predicted that performance relative to aspiration level
impacts managers‟ risk preference, which in turn, impacts whether firms follow or deviate from
the mutual forbearance logic. This argument is strongly supported across all models for both
market entry and exit. The skewed curves shown in Figures 6.4, 6.6, 6.8, and 6.10 depict the
competitive behavior after the introduction of bounded rationality into the rational logic of the
mutual forbearance hypothesis. The results show distinct competitive behaviors when firm
performance is above and below aspiration level.
Like other goals that firms pursue, abiding by the multimarket structures established with
rivals is an organizational goal (Cyert and March, 1963). Firms pursue this competitive goal in
order to benefit from the decreased levels of rivalry and enhanced performance that mutual
forbearance provides. I found that firms are more likely to pursue competitive goals when
performance goals are satisfied. This is true for firms performing above aspiration level and
consistent with results from previous studies. For example, Greve (1998) found that high
performing firms are less willing to abandon the multimarket strategy that generated the high
performance in the first place, and more recently, Greve (2008) found that firms only attend to
other goals when performance goals are satisfied. Thus, high performing firms do not have
incentives to change their competitive behavior, and therefore, performance above aspiration
level does not impact the forbearance-oriented market entry and exit behaviors.
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The situation is quite different for firms performing below aspiration level. Low-performing
firms deviate from the mutual forbearance logic because their performance goals are not
satisfied. As predicted, performance below aspiration level impacts managers‟ risk preference,
thus affecting how managers make decisions at the light of their firms‟ competitive environment.
However, the effect of performance below aspiration level on mutual forbearance logic is
contingent upon the organizational context. Abundant-slack firms perceive the discrepancy as a
repairable gap, and therefore, are more likely to pursue risk in order to recover from the shortfall.
Thus, performance below aspiration level for high slack firms amplifies the effect of multimarket
contact on market entry and makes them take longer to forbear. On the other hand, low-slack
firms perceive the discrepancy as a threat to firm survival, which induces risk aversion. Thus,
resource-poor firms decrease entry rates and start forbearing sooner. Indeed, Figure 6.6 shows
that for firms with very low levels of slack, entry rate almost declines monotonically with
multimarket contact.
The same effects for abundant- and limited-slack firms are also found in market exit
behavior. Performance below aspiration level for high-slack firms attenuates the effect of
multimarket contact on exit rates, significantly reducing them. On the other hand, performance
below aspiration level for low-slack firms amplifies the multimarket effect, significantly
increasing exit rates. These findings are consistent with previous divestiture studies. For
instance, Chang (1996) found that high-resource firms divested not as often as low-resource
firms when faced with the same performance gap, and Lieberman (1990) found that resourcerich firms are able to decrease capacity incrementally when facing decline.

6.2.4 Diversification through a geo-product lens
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Figure 6.15 depicts some tentative evidence of typical patterns of diversification. The figure
plots the number of diversification events occurred across categories of diversification.
Geographic diversification means previous experience in the target product market (same
product market/new geographic market), and product diversification means previous
experience in the target geographic market (same geographic market/new product market).
Finally, geo-product diversification means experience in both the target product market (selling
the same product in other geographic markets) and the target geographic market (selling other
products in the geographic market).
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Figure 6.14 – Patterns of diversification

The figure shows interesting patterns of diversification over time. By far, firms tend to
engage in geographic diversification. They have experience in the product market and expand
geographically into new markets. Next, they engage in geo-product diversification, which
indicates that they attempt to leverage both their product and local market knowledge. Only a
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few events involve product diversification. In the context of the U.S. insurance industry, firms
must have underwriting capabilities in order to write new types of insurance, and this may
prevent them from diversifying into new product markets, even when they already operate in the
target geographic market.
These results suggest that that product and geographic dimensions are likely to be jointly
considered when managers make decisions about the firm‟s scope. Firms first expand into new
geographic markets, perhaps because product structures are easily replicated across new
geographic locations, whereas entering into new business requires knowledge about the new
product. Most importantly, firms attempt to combine their product experience in other
geographic markets and knowledge in the local market by engaging in geo-product
diversification. This descriptive evidence demonstrates the richness of examining diversification
through a geo-product lens.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

This final chapter includes two sections. The first section discusses the theoretical,
empirical, and managerial implications of this dissertation. Limitations of this study and
opportunities for future research are proposed in the last section.

7.1 Implications
This dissertation has theoretical, empirical and managerial implications, which are discussed
in turn.
Theoretical implications
This dissertation breaks new ground in trying to understand how firms make decisions about
their scope of business in the light of their internal and external environments. I believe that I
make several contributions to theory, namely by addressing: (1) the behavioral boundary
conditions of mutual forbearance, (2) exit decisions, (3) geo-product diversification, and (4) the
competitive antecedents of corporate strategic decisions.
First, this study challenges the completeness of our understanding of multimarket
competition, due to prior research‟s sole reliance on rational-economic assumptions of
competitive interaction. Except for a few studies (e.g. Stephan et al., 2003), the role of managers
in multimarket competition research has been largely ignored. The results of this study
underscore how predictions based on prior research are likely to be, at best, incomplete. For
example, although the rational-economic view of mutual forbearance suggests that firms
coordinate their actions in order to maximize profits, from a behavioral perspective, we know
that firms avoid uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963). In fact, because strategic management
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looks at strategic decisions of managers, failure to incorporate a behavioral perspective into
economic-rational models provides an incomplete understanding of our field. This study suggests
that bringing a behavioral perspective into the theory of multimarket competition provides a
more accurate picture of the competitive interactions among firms.
In a broader perspective, this dissertation responds to long-standing calls for research
integrating behavioral issues into rational-economic models. As Zajac and Bazerman (1991, p.
52) noted “strategic management research may benefit from taking an integrated
behavioral/economic perspective toward specific topics from the industrial organization
economic literature.” In the same vein, Farjoun and Lai (1997, p. 271) encouraged strategy
researchers “to design theoretical models that retain the elegance of rational analysis but also
incorporate the reality of bounded rationality of decision makers.” The empirical evidence of this
dissertation gives us an example of how our understanding can be greatly improved when
integrating the rational-economic and cognitive perspectives into the same theoretical
framework. Moreover, these results point to the importance of revisiting past studies. Indeed, the
application of this integrative logic to other rational-economic models seems fruitful.
Second, the empirical evidence of this dissertation shows that exit is not the mirror image of
entry. The dynamics of multimarket entry strategies differ in important ways from the patterns
observed in the study of exit rates. Moreover, another contribution made by this dissertation is an
explicit focus on under-performing firms. Across social sciences studies, there is an historical
emphasis on growth-related issues (Anheier et al. 1999). Within strategy field, scholars have
extensively investigated causes of above-average returns and consequences of improved
performance for firms (Barney and Arikan 2001). However, a greater emphasis on expansion and
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high financial performance raises serious heterogeneity issues, as understanding both causes of
contraction in the scope and how under-performing firms compete should be equally relevant.
Third, this study has implications for research in geographic and product diversification.
Empirical research on geographic and product diversification has largely evolved as individual
streams of research. Geographic diversification has been an area of interest for international
strategy scholars as they examine entry into other countries, and geographic expansion is also an
important area in organization theory. In the realm of corporate strategy, the study of
diversification has heavily relied on product markets, perhaps due to availability of archival data
(e.g. SIC codes). Although treated as separate phenomena in the research community, these two
dimensions are likely to be jointly considered when managers make decisions about the firm‟s
scope. Hence, these dimensions have to be considered simultaneously when examining
diversification. Only looking one or the other neither reflects the external market nor the way
that managers view the competitive landscape. Indeed, as noted by D‟Aveni (2001, p. 4)
“At corporate and divisional headquarters or within marketing departments, managers work to stake
out their product positioning on parts of the geographic space. No matter whether you are a CEO or
brand manager, you compete and cooperate to win the most attractive geo-product markets, and you
do so as part of a larger system comprised of many rivals with varying amounts of strong and weak
territories, and hence varying degrees of power.”

This dissertation attempts to capture some of this tension and struggle that managers face in
organizations, contributing with a more complete picture of corporate strategic decisions.
Finally, this dissertation contributes to research on the antecedents of corporate strategy. As
with any strategic decision, diversification and divestment decisions are not made in a vacuum;
the competitive context in which firms are involved influence how they expand and contract their
business scope. While research in corporate strategy has greatly advanced our understanding of
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the role of firm-specific resources and capabilities in acquisitions and other business scope
decisions, the impact of the competitive context is largely unexplored. Multimarket competition
research can offer a framework for examining the influence of competitors on those decisions.
For instance, a firm‟s acquisition or internal development of a new business unit may have
motives other than excess capacity or core competences. In fact, Microsoft is currently facing
this issue, as Apple‟s competition is forcing it to open its own retail stores (Wall Street Journal,
2009). My dissertation fills this important gap in corporate strategy literature, by showing that a
multimarket perspective applied to corporate strategy provides explanations for interaction
between firms that share common markets. Accordingly, I lend support to the claim that
“corporate strategy decisions can only be imperfectly understood if competitive interaction is not
taken into account” (McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998, p. 724).

Empirical implications
This dissertation also provides empirical contributions. The dataset I used provide depth of
information regarding entry and exit behavior without resorting to changes in SIC code
membership or changes in ownership (e.g. acquisition announcements and divestitures).
Consequently, I was able to capture exit decisions that occurred well before a formal divestiture
or dissolution would eventually occur.
My research design also successfully addresses several issues from past research in
multimarket competition. First, I tested the theoretical model in a well established industry.
Greve (2000) argued that future research should examine scope decisions made in other
competitive contexts, focusing on recent data and on mature industries. Second, I was able to
calculate multimarket contact in a meaningful way, by weighing the markets by strategic
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importance. Boeker et al. (1997) suggested that markets weighed by importance better reflect the
real conditions under which managers make business scope decisions. Third, by using geoproduct markets, this dissertation provides a strong test of mutual forbearance logic. Taking
together, these research efforts help strengthen the theoretical validity of the multimarket
construct and theory.
This dissertation also contributes to research on behavioral foundations of strategic
management. This study replicated Audia and Greve (2006), strengthening the validity of their
results and the applicability of their method to test the March-Shapira (1992) shifting-focus of
risk taking. Researchers are strongly encouraged to follow these prescriptions in studies that
examine the role of organizational context in the reaction to performance feedback.
The theoretical model developed in this dissertation posed enormous challenges to research
design. The model hypothesized the moderating effect of spline functions as well as the effects
of two-way interactions on inverted curvilinear relationships, situations that are seldom, if ever,
examined in strategic management research. Thus, this dissertation contributes with an
innovative research design suitable for the study of behavioral implications of rational-economic
models.

Managerial implications
This study has several managerial contributions. The results are supported by data from the
service industry, that is to say, the study departs from a focus on capital-intensive industries (e.g.
manufacturing, airlines) to a focus on an information-intensive industry, which is in an important
sector of the economy. Managers will be better informed about how managers in service
industries make business scope decisions at the light of their firms‟ competitive environment.
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Indeed, some authors suggest that the competitive interaction, and, by extension, the source of
competitive advantage in service and manufacturing industries might be different (Korn and
Baum 2001).
For a practitioner, the results should also make one wary of relying on the original mutual
forbearance predictions that competitors with high levels of multimarket contact would forbear
from entering new markets. My model help managers make informed predictions about a rival‟s
likelihood of attack in their current market domains, by showing that under-performing firms
deviate from the traditional logic. Consequently, they can be proactive, outsmarting potential
entrants with acquisition or internal development strategies in less targeted markets. On the other
hand, managers can expect that high-performing firms will be more likely abide by the tacit
agreements with competitors.

7.2 Limitations and opportunities for future research
My theory did not rely on any idiosyncratic characteristic of the insurance industry and,
therefore, the theoretical predictions should generalize to other industries. However, the
multiplier effects may vary across industries. Accordingly, Stephan et al. (2003) noted that the
inflection point is likely to vary across industries.
Furthermore, the U.S. insurance industry is regulated at the state and federal levels, a
situation that may affect the baseline hazard of market entry and exit. However, it is not clear
that this would produce coefficient biases in the direction of the results.
There remains much room for future study. Studies incorporating a larger sample, a sample
from different industries, or one with more control variables will certainly be invaluable for
replication purposes. It would be also important that future studies follow the operationalization
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of variables used in this study (e.g. multimarket contact weighted by strategic importance and
normalized measures of organizational slack). This prescription would greatly advance research
in this area, as researchers would be able to compare results across different empirical settings.
This dissertation has offered a behaviorally-based perspective of multimarket competition
with respect to entry and exit decisions. It would be interesting to look at other aspects of
competitive dynamics and see whether firms deviate from mutual forbearance predictions with
respect to those decisions.
Much of the existing research in multimarket competition has relied solely on secondary and
archival data sources. As a result, multimarket competition research links the observed
multimarket structure to the observed market entry and exit behavior, bypassing some
unobserved behavioral decision-making issues. It is fruitful that future research use primary data
collected from key decision makers. This approach can provide a complement to archival
approaches as it captures issues facing managers in market entry and exit decisions.
Another important extension of this study is to examine the performance consequences of
the behavioral model of multimarket competition. Do risk-seeking firms that deviate from the
mutual forbearance predictions enhance their financial performance? Are risk-averse firms able
to survive or do they become frozen into patterns of low performance? Examination of these
questions can shed light in the nature of competitive dynamics under conditions of adversity and
ambiguity.
This study is among the first to examine market entry and exit across two dimensions of the
firm‟s business scope, geographic and product markets. Because such decisions are at the core of
corporate strategy, future research should examine the patterns of diversification with respect to
these dimensions, as well as explore the effects of such patterns on firm performance.
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To advance research, we, as researchers, are challenged to investigate and understand the
nature of the interactions and interdependencies that drive collective phenomena (Morgeson &
Hofmann, 1999). It is hoped that my theoretical framework and research design can help guide
and inspire further work on this direction.
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Table 6.1 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Market Entry
Variables
Mean
s.d.
min
max
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Entry
0.03
0.16
0
1
1.
0.73
0.13
0.25
1.00
0.02
2. MMC
0.14
0.04
0.06
0.31
-0.02
0.22
3. Market concentration
1.61
1.34
0
10
0.02
-0.03 -0.09
4. Market attractiveness
35.61
9.62
12
62
0.04
-0.35 -0.44 0.21
5. Market density
20.87
11.68
1
101
0.09
0.13
0.08 -0.01 -0.22
6. Market experience
1.42
3.80
0
32
0.09
0.04
0.01
0.00 -0.03 0.22
7. Entry experience
20.73
1.58
15.76
25.59
0.03
-0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 0.53
0.06
8. Firm size
0.18
0.38
0
1
-0.04
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.09 -0.09 0.07
9. Mutual firm
0.06
0.10
0.00
1.31
0.00
-0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.03
0.01 -0.02
10. Performance above aspiration level
-0.05
0.11
-1.21
0.00
-0.01
-0.02 0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.05
11. Performance below aspiration level
1.67
0.38
0
3.19
0.01
0.01 -0.02 0.02
0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.04
12. Slack
|r| > .01 implies significance at p < .05.
These statistics are calculated on data covering 55,963 firm-market-year observations on multimarket firms making 1,430 market entry moves between 1998 and 2008.
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Table 6.5 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Market Exit
Variables
Mean
s.d.
min
max
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0.07
0.25 0.00
1
1. Exit
0.78
0.08 0.28
1
-0.03
2. MMC
0.14
0.04 0.06
0.31
0.01
0.23
3. Market concentration
41.48
8.47
12
62
0.00
-0.39
-0.33
4. Market density
1.73
1.38
0
10
0.01
-0.01
-0.05
0.22
5. Market attractiveness
23.47 18.43
1
102
-0.08
-0.16
0.09
-0.15
-0.01
6. Market experience
2.22
6.64
0
32
0.00
-0.04
0.01
0.02
0.03
-0.01
7. Entry experience
22.44
1.61 15.76 25.59
-0.04
-0.07
0.03
-0.12
-0.05
0.58
-0.08
8. Firm size
0.20
0.40
0
1
-0.10
0.05
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.10
0.14
9. Mutual firm
0.04
0.09 0.00
1.31
0.05
-0.06
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.04
0.03
0.06
-0.07
10. Performance above aspiration level
-0.04
0.10 -1.21
0.00
-0.10
-0.05
0.01
-0.05
-0.01
0.06
-0.05
0.02
0.07
11. Performance below aspiration level
1.55
0.27
0
3.19
-0.13
0.05
0.00
0.01
0.00
-0.22
-0.01
-0.15
0.26
12. Slack
|r| > .01 implies significance at p < .05.
These statistics are calculated on data covering 40,224 firm-market-year observations on multimarket firms making 1,789 market exit moves between 1998 and 2008.
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